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Abstract 
 
Public memory of psychological casualties from the Great War and the Second World War has 
recalled men who were shunned and scorned by society and their peers. Using letters and diaries 
written contemporaneously within the two World Wars, and newspapers and official documents 
from the inter-war period, this paper examines the attitudes of Second World War New Zealand 
soldiers to those in their midst who were mentally injured by their experiences and unable to 
continue their duties. This research indicates that there was more compassion and sympathy from 
government agencies, the public and comrades of shell shock and anxiety neurosis victims, than has 
been indicated in existing historiography. The onset of shell shock during the Great War of 1914 to 
1918, and how it entered the public sphere, influenced the attitudes of the men who, a generation 
later, were again going into battle. Social changes in New Zealand, both before and during the 
Second World War, are investigated to determine how they influenced the attitudes of the men of 
the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force during World War Two in comparison to those of the 
New Zealand Expeditionary Force of the Great War. 
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Abbreviations 
2NZ Div  2nd New Zealand Division 
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Glossary 
 
 
All definitions are from the Oxford University Press Online Dictionary,  
URL: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com unless otherwise noted. 
 
Anxiety Neurosis 
Any of various disorders (such as panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, a phobia, or 
generalized anxiety disorder) in which anxiety is a predominant feature. See also Battle Fatigue; 
Combat Exhaustion; Shell Shock. http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/  
 
Battle Fatigue 
Post-traumatic stress disorder occurring under wartime conditions (as combat) that cause intense 
stress. http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/  
 
Combat Exhaustion 
Post-traumatic stress disorder occurring under wartime conditions (as combat) that cause intense 
stress. http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/  
 
Hysteria 
A psychological disorder (not now regarded as a single definite condition) whose symptoms include 
conversion of psychological stress into physical symptoms (somatization), selective amnesia, shallow 
volatile emotions, and overdramatic or attention-seeking behaviour.  
 
Neurasthenia 
A medical condition characterized by lassitude, fatigue, headache, and irritability, associated chiefly 
with emotional disturbance.  
 
Neuralgia 
Intense, typically intermittent pain along the course of a nerve, especially in the head or face. 
 
Neurology  
The branch of medicine or biology that deals with the anatomy, functions, and organic disorders of 
nerves and the nervous system.  
Neurosis  
A relatively mild mental illness that is not caused by organic disease, involving symptoms of stress 
(depression, anxiety, obsessive behaviour, hypochondria) but not a radical loss of touch with reality. 
 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
Psychological reaction that occurs after experiencing a highly stressing event (as wartime combat, 
physical violence, or a natural disaster) outside the range of normal human experience and that is 
usually characterized by depression, anxiety, flashbacks, recurrent nightmares, and avoidance of 
reminders of the event—abbreviation PTSD. 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/  
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Psychiatry  
1. The study and treatment of mental illness, emotional disturbance, and abnormal behaviour.  
2. The branch of medicine that deals with the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of mental and 
emotional disorders. 
 
Psychoanalysis  
A system of psychological theory and therapy which aims to treat mental disorders by investigating 
the interaction of conscious and unconscious elements in the mind and bringing repressed fears and 
conflicts into the conscious mind by techniques such as dream interpretation and free association.  
 
Psychogenic  
Having a psychological origin or cause rather than a physical one: 
 
Psychology  
1. The scientific study of the human mind and its functions, especially those affecting behaviour in a 
given context. 
2. The mental characteristics or attitude of a person or group. 
 
Psychoneurosis  
A neurosis based on emotional conflict in which an impulse that has been blocked seeks expression 
in a disguised response or symptom 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/  
 
Psychosis 
A severe mental disorder in which thought and emotions are so impaired that contact is lost with 
external reality: 
 
Psychosomatic  
1. Of a physical illness or other condition caused or aggravated by a mental factor such as internal 
conflict or stress. 
2. Relating to the interaction of mind and body: 
 
Shell Shock 
An ill-defined mental illness resulting from traumatic exposure to danger or the fear of danger. 
Presentation can include any combination of some or all of the following symptoms:- 
Headaches, back-pain, dizziness, insomnia, shaking and tremors, hyperventilation, heart palpitations 
anxiety, irritability, confusion, sweating, nausea and vomiting, loss of appetite, excessive or 
uncontrolled urination or defecation, edginess, easily startled, abdominal distress. 
See also Anxiety Neurosis, Combat Exhaustion, Battle Fatigue. 
 
Trauma 
1. A deeply distressing or disturbing experience. 
2. Emotional shock following a stressful event or a physical injury, which may be associated with 
physical shock and sometimes leads to long-term neurosis. 
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The Chances by Wilfred Owen  
I mind as 'ow the night afore that show 
Us five got talking, - we was in the know, 
"Over the top to-morrer; boys, we're for it, 
First wave we are, first ruddy wave; that's tore it." 
"Ah well," says Jimmy, - an' 'e's seen some scrappin' - 
"There ain't more nor five things as can 'appen; 
Ye get knocked out; else wounded - bad or cushy; 
Scuppered; or nowt except yer feeling mushy." 
One of us got the knock-out, blown to chops. 
T'other was hurt, like, losin' both 'is props. 
An' one, to use the word of 'ypocrites, 
'Ad the misfortoon to be took by Fritz. 
Now me, I wasn't scratched, praise God Almighty 
(Though next time please I'll thank 'im for a blighty), 
But poor young Jim, 'e's livin' an' 'e's not; 
'E reckoned 'e'd five chances, an' 'e's 'ad; 
'E's wounded, killed, and pris'ner, all the lot - 
The ruddy lot all rolled in one. Jim's mad.1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The ramifications of the psychological and physical trauma experienced by New Zealand soldiers 
who served in the Great War were still being felt by New Zealand society on the outbreak of World 
War Two. As products of their communities the New Zealand men who served in the Second World 
War held the beliefs and attitudes of the society of which they were members. Their attitudes 
towards psychological casualties would thus be expected to be framed by the views of mental illness 
in society at large, reflecting any empathy, discrimination and stigma associated with the illness in 
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their own communities. Conscious of this context, this paper examines the attitudes of the soldiers 
of the 2nd New Zealand Division during World War Two towards the men who succumbed to 
psychological injury. 
The effect on society of the return of psychologically damaged men from the Great War was evident 
in many areas. Increased demand on the pension system, psychiatric facilities and stress on the 
court system through justice and divorce processes all indicated to society at large that modern war 
left more than physical scars on veterans. It is evident that both government and society were 
unprepared for the number of psychological casualties and resources required for effective care. The 
period following the Great War saw a shift in attitude towards mental illness in New Zealand as shell 
shocked men were repatriated into the community or were placed in institutions. The pre-war belief 
that mental illness was hereditary was challenged as men who had no known family history or 
predisposition had broken mentally while at war or on return to their communities. It was anathema 
to their families and friends that the best of the nation’s manhood, fit young men who had 
volunteered to serve their country, to be placed in institutions with lunatics and tarred with the 
social stigma associated with mental illness. With the realisation that this form of mental illness 
could afflict any one irrespective of predisposition or environment, there was a re-evaluation within 
society of the position of the mentally ill. 
New Zealanders that served in World War Two were raised in a society that had lionised the men of 
the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF). Memorials to the ‘Glorious Dead’ of the Great War 
were the centrepieces of Anzac Day celebrations. Irrespective of their original motives for enlisting, 
their communities believed that their men had done ‘something special’ for New Zealand. The 
Returned Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Associations (RSSA) was notably apolitical in the inter-war years, but 
focused on welfare issues for returned servicemen and their families, staunchly protecting the rights 
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and importantly image of New Zealand servicemen.2 In time the image was embedded in public 
memory of heroic actions in bloody battles that had established New Zealand as a nation in its own 
right. This image became central to remembrance of the Great War in New Zealand. The 
environment of support for those who had served and played their own part in forming their country 
was reinforced yearly with dawn parades and services at monuments to the communities’ dead.  
Most research on war neuroses has focused on the victims themselves, and their inter-relationships 
with the systems and people they came in contact with once afflicted, whether medical, military or 
social. How psychological casualties were seen by their peers has not been examined in a New 
Zealand context, but has been considered from the perspective of the effects on the afflicted men, 
and their relationships with their families and the mechanisms of the welfare system. Alison Parr’s 
Silent Casualties: New Zealand’s Unspoken Legacy of Second World War concerns itself with the 
consequences of psychological injury on repatriated individuals and their families.3 John McLeod 
looks at the morale of New Zealand soldiers of 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF) and its 
effect on the mental aspects of combat stress as a part of his thesis and subsequent book Myth and 
Reality: The New Zealand Soldier in World War II.4 Myth and Reality removes the aura of invincibility 
that nationalistic public memory placed around New Zealand soldiers by contending that 2NZEF had 
representatives of all sorts of individuals, good and bad, in the same way they are present in society. 
Myth and Reality does not, however, examine the attitude of the men themselves toward 
psychological casualties. 
Most material available that relates to psychological casualties in World War Two focuses on British 
and American soldiers. Ben Shephard’s opus work, A War of Nerves, untangles the complexities of 
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 For discussion of this point see Gwen Parsons, ‘The Many Derelicts of War?’: Repatriation and Great War 
Veterans in Dunedin and Ashburton, 1918 to 1928, (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2008) and Russell Clark, 
‘Not Mad, But Very Ill’; The Treatment of New Zealand’s Shellshocked Soldiers 1914 to 1939, (MA Thesis, 
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4 
 
military psychiatry in western nations from the Great War until the Vietnam War and explains the 
influences of psychiatrists and psychologists on the advancement of treatment and definition of 
traumatic stress.5 John McManus gives an excellent overview of the attitudes and motivations of the 
American soldier in The Deadly Brotherhood; The American Combat Soldier in World War II.6 Using 
material from the European and Pacific theatres, McManus argues that personal bonds within small 
units maintained morale and combat effectiveness. More academic, Robert Ahrenfeldt in Psychiatry 
in the British Army in the Second World War also argues for the importance of morale in maintaining 
unit cohesion, but also notes the effect discipline had in prevention of psychological casualties. This 
was associated with psychological evaluation of potential recruits to minimise the selection for 
combat duties of men who exhibited predisposition to nervous disorders.7 A major work on 
psychological casualties during World War Two is Copp and McAndrew’s Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers 
and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945.8 Presenting the relationship between the army 
and the psychiatrists and psychologists who served with Canadian forces, Battle Exhaustion provides 
background on stresses incumbent on combat soldiers as well as comparative psychological casualty 
figures in Canadian theatres of operation. This is again, however, a top down history and does not 
examine the views of the men on the ground. 
New Zealand’s armed forces during both world wars were citizen armies based around a small 
professional cadre as the core of volunteer forces. There is more similarity to the American armed 
forces in this regard than with the British Army with its permanent establishment of regimental 
units. However, the close affinity with Britain in organisation, equipment and tactical doctrine places 
the New Zealand army in a unique position.9 The factors that influenced the attitudes of New 
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Zealand soldiers are unique to New Zealand’s situation and the changes in New Zealand society that 
occurred from 1914 to 1945 are not exactly present elsewhere.  
This paper will examine the attitudes of serving New Zealand soldiers towards psychological 
casualties during World War Two, using the diaries and letters of the soldiers serving overseas. 
Focusing on the 2nd New Zealand Division (2NZ Div) in North Africa, the Mediterranean and Italy, it 
will explore the views of the men towards those among their comrades who succumbed to the 
psychological stresses of combat, how these views were shaped and how they differed from the 
men who served in the Great War. Exploration of the attitudes of soldiers towards a particularly 
insidious occupational hazard will shed some light on the gap between the public myths and 
associated social memories of the war with the actual realities of the existence of combat troops.  
Chapter One outlines briefly the development of theories relating to shell shock and war neurosis 
prior to the Great War, including historical references to psychological injury noted in pre-modern 
wars and conflicts. The intertwining relationship between psychoneurosis in a martial context and 
hysteria in a civilian context complicated the development of an effective treatment for shell shock 
victims in the early years of the Great War. Charcot and Babinski in France and Freud in Austria (and 
later London when he fled Nazism) had limited influence on the thinking of British (and therefore 
New Zealand’s) psychiatric medical practice, although they were the leading experts on hysteria and 
its treatment in a civilian context. Militarily, the regimental system and the relatively low status of 
the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) within the army, in both Britain and New Zealand, did not 
create an environment conducive to advanced medical thinking. Thus, on the cusp of the outbreak 
of the Great War, the New Zealand Army was unprepared for the emergence of psychological 
casualties.  
Chapter Two will examine shell shock as a phenomenon in the Great War, how it was viewed initially 
and how it was dealt with conceptually as a morale and disciplinary issue. ‘Shell shock’ transforms 
from a term attempting to define the multiple and varying symptoms of psychological casualties to a 
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catchall public phrase referencing all forms of psychological illness resulting from war service; and in 
the process became a term with greater meaning in the public domain than in the military sphere. 
The three parties concerned with shell shock and its manifestation; soldiers, military authorities and 
public, all had different views of it and treated the victims in different manners. In many ways shell 
shock transcended the medical context of its origin and entered the public lexicon as an entity in its 
own right.  
Chapter Three examines the attitudes of New Zealand soldiers during the Great War towards 
psychological casualties and how these differed from those of the public and military command. 
Defining how soldiers viewed shell shock and psychological damage during the Great War is 
important because of its influence on the manner in which society viewed mental trauma through 
the inter-war years. Soldiers did not consider psychological casualties in the same manner as their 
leaders in a time of war; and in many ways differently from the public that saw their husbands, sons 
and brothers returning home mentally broken. The perception of the relationship between generals 
and soldiers, viewed from today, differs from that during the Great War. Generals responsible for 
winning (or at least not losing) the war had to keep soldiers in the lines facing the enemy; the 
soldiers in the lines looked towards little but being able to remove themselves from the hazards they 
were experiencing.  
Chapter Four will examine social and military attitudes towards mental illness during the inter-war 
years and how these attitudes influenced the men who became the soldiers who served in New 
Zealand forces in World War Two. Reintegration of returned servicemen mentally damaged in the 
Great War had an effect on New Zealand society and was a factor in change in public attitudes 
towards mental illness and institutionalisation. The mechanism of public communication during this 
period was overwhelmingly the medium of newspapers, with the addition in the later 1920’s of radio 
broadcasting and talking movies. How these mediums portrayed shell shock and the influence they 
had on how psychological casualties were viewed in World War Two is examined. The development 
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of a sense of New Zealand nationhood, wrought through the deeds of the Anzacs, engendered a 
legend regarding the actions of New Zealand soldiers during the Great War that made the exposure 
of the realities of the human cost of the war difficult to express or explain publicly. Art and literature 
became a medium for attempting to answer questions society had about the realities experienced 
by New Zealand servicemen while they were overseas. The dichotomy of public memory and the 
actualities of war came into direct opposition through the reaction to the ‘war book craze’ of the 
early 1930’s. The influence of this outpouring of literature and art on the formation of the attitudes 
of servicemen in World War Two is examined. Additionally, most of the leadership of New Zealand’s 
armed forces in World War Two had served in the Great War. Their attitude to shell shock influenced 
the manner in which they managed it in their areas of responsibility, through training and command 
methods.  
Chapter Five will explain the attitudes 2NZEF combat troops had towards psychological casualties 
and how these views changed through the duration of the war as the conditions in the war zones 
and their homes in New Zealand altered. The furlough schemes put in place to rotate long service 
men to New Zealand for leave began to create grievances amongst those left behind, especially as 
those that did return to 2NZEF brought stories of conditions and behaviour of people in New 
Zealand. The effect this had on morale and changes of attitudes in the theatre of operations to men 
who could not ‘do their bit’ is looked at in the light of men that had not been home for years. The 
view that the people in New Zealand were not taking the war seriously once the Americans had 
nullified the threat of Japanese invasion, and therefore tended to marginalise the men in Italy, began 
to take hold in 2NZEF. This in turn hardened the attitudes of the soldiers towards those considered 
to be ‘not pulling their weight’, who were seen as prolonging the war and therefore delaying the 
return home of the 2NZEF men. 
The majority of primary sources for this paper are letters and diaries of soldiers written while they 
were on active service. Use of primary sources written during overseas service ensures accurate 
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recall untainted by time and the influence of social pressure that could affect the veracity of stories 
retold in later years or as oral history. However, a number of oral histories have been utilised where 
there is corroborating evidence or the views are of specific interest in themselves.10 In addition, a 
number of contemporary reminiscences are utilised. These were written entries for a competition 
sponsored by the NZEF Times, the weekly newspaper published by 2NZEF Headquarters.11 Entries 
were required to be verified by the writer’s commanding officer as accurate in detail and fact. An 
additional source is 2NZEF Field Censor Section reports which provide a unique view of the thoughts 
and issues that concerned New Zealand soldiers. The newspapers published during the inter-war 
years are utilised to examine the attitudes of the public towards mental illness and shell shock in 
that period, as well as gaining an insight into the influences affecting the young men who 
volunteered for service in World War Two. 
Letters, despite their value as primary sources, do have some limitations due to censorship. 
Censorship occurred on two levels among New Zealand troops posted overseas; official censorship 
that restricted comment or communication relating to military matters, and a form of self imposed 
censorship that restricted comment that would offend or upset the recipients of the letters. The 
small town nature of New Zealand in the first half of the twentieth century - where it was likely that 
a whole community would hear news from the letters of their overseas troops –meant few soldiers 
wrote critically of their companions in case of giving offence to their relatives or friends.12 Stigma 
associated with mental illness will not have encouraged discussion of psychological casualties. The 
small community characteristic was still evident during World War Two amongst New Zealand 
troops overseas, where it was common to write of meeting acquaintances and friends in 
neighbouring units or of receiving the community gossip in letters from home. The provincial nature 
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 For in depth discussion of the problems of using oral history, especially when recounted a long period after 
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Statements. 
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 Jock Phillips, Nicholas Boyack and E.P. Malone (eds), The Great Adventure: New Zealand Soldiers Describe 
the First World War, (Auckland, 1988), p. 6. 
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of the battalion organisation within the 2nd New Zealand Division (2NZ Div) ensured that men were 
often placed in units with their neighbours or people they were acquainted with before the war.  
Alongside the restrictions that influenced the communications of the men overseas with their homes 
was the unspoken notion that those in New Zealand would not understand the realities of what they 
were going through, even if they could find words to describe it in the first place. Letters tended to 
be comforting or flippant in describing only the lighter moments, rarely describing the horrors the 
men were actually facing, and references to men who had died or had been wounded were 
mentioned briefly or as generalities in terms that were euphemistic or vague. The use of euphemism 
is a common human technique to deflect pain or grief and is common amongst soldiers, or in fact 
any group of people who are regularly dealing with unpleasantness. 
The censorship regime utilised by 2NZEF from 1939 to 1945 precluded inclusion of any reference to 
sickness or casualties in letters written home. Regulations allowed only references to personal or 
family matters when discussing casualties. Perforce these meant references to psychological 
casualties were fragmentary or were in contravention of regulations and missed by the censoring 
process. The efficiency of the censor process in 2NZEF was audited by the Field Censor Sections, 
which reported regularly to 2NZEF and 2NZ Div. Headquarters on general security in 
correspondence, the topics the men were writing home about and commenting on their general 
morale and views of the course of the war.13  
One of the themes running through letters and diaries of soldiers is that the unpleasant can happen 
to anyone in the combat zone, and the longer one is in combat, the more likely they are to become a 
casualty, either physically or mentally. This fact does not filter through the reminiscences of army 
commanders or technical descriptions of battles. The overview of a battle is the territory of 
commanders who direct the forces or the historians who write about it later. The aspect seen by 
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those who actually do the fighting is limited to what they are able to see under restrictive 
conditions, such as smoke, darkness, being in earthworks or under cover, and all encompassed by 
fear and stress and noise. The other experience the combat soldier has of battle is the emotional, 
what he feels and how he relates to those immediately around him when under enemy (and 
sometimes ‘friendly’) fire. 
How the soldier relates to those around him is an important characteristic in the context of mental 
breakdown in battle for two main reasons. Firstly is the morale and esprit de corps that binds a man 
to his comrades and his unit. This sense of pride in being part of the group and pride in the group 
itself is an important factor in helping prevent mental breakdown of men in combat. The other 
characteristic is the sense of comradeship towards those within the group, knowing that under the 
most trying and difficult circumstances small group unity is to be relied on and knowing that the 
group will work to ensure the survival of the individual as much as possible, just as the individual will 
return that loyalty to the group in the same manner. It is the loss of this bond through battle 
casualties breaking down unit cohesion that most seriously affects the morale of individuals and 
units. The unity with the group is also a major factor in the feelings of guilt that casualties, 
psychological and physical, endure following their removal from the group.  
Defining psychological injury in the two World Wars is made difficult as advances in medical 
knowledge changed the manner in which ‘shell shock’ and its antecedents were categorised and 
treated. The existence of psychosomatic illness in many cases saw the characterisation of 
psychological illness as physical injury or sickness, especially in the area of cardiology.14 The 
symptoms for psychological injury had a number of similar characteristics but ancillary symptoms 
could vary radically from man to man. Different men could manifest totally different symptoms, 
dependent on predisposition, the manner of the trauma they suffered and the nature of the support 
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 See Chapter Three for discussion of the diagnosis and reporting of DAH in the British and New Zealand 
Armies in the Great War. See also Archives NZ, CAJM W5726 22889, I i/26 1942, Medical Administrative 
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they received in the immediate aftermath of the presentation of symptoms.  Shell shock became a 
catchall term in the early war years to define any psychological illness related to military service. 
When shell shock was superseded as an official medical definition, it had already established itself as 
an entity in its own right in the public lexicon.  
For the purposes of simplicity I will be using the term ‘shell shock’ or ‘shell shocked’ to describe the 
illness and condition of afflicted men when discussing the Great War and the inter-war years and I 
will use ‘psychoneurosis’ when discussing psychological casualties in World War Two. Shell shock 
was the most commonly used term during the Great War to describe psychological injury, even after 
its discontinuation as an official medical term, as it seemed to encapsulate all the characteristics 
inherent in the condition. It continued in the public arena, however, and is still recognisable in public 
memory as a term that describes the psychological damage resulting from war service. The not 
unpleasant alliteration of the term ‘shell shock’ is likely to have contributed to its longevity after it 
had ceased to be used in its original environment, and it took on a life of its own in the community 
to describe any and all mental effects war had on the individual’s mind, irrespective of the cause and 
symptoms. While overtaken by Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in current times as a 
description for the mental condition immediately following trauma in both military and civilian 
applications, shell shock is still commonly used by the media to describe the stunned condition of 
people following a shock or surprise. There is evidence that the term ‘shell shock’ was being used in 
this manner even before the end of the Great War.  
There are a number of other terms utilised by doctors, psychologists and psychiatrists to describe 
the mental illness resulting from war. Understanding of the exact nature of the effects of trauma on 
individuals was not encapsulated into a single disease entity until the introduction of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) into the psycho-medical lexicon in 1980. There is still debate on the exact 
12 
 
nature of PTSD and its symptoms are still being refined with each new edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Medical Disorders (DSM) series.15  
In the context of 2NZEF, during the early months of the deployment of 2NZEF in North Africa the 
reports from the Director of Medical Services (DMS), the officer controlling medical arrangements 
within 2NZ Div., to the Director General of Medical Services of 2NZEF (DGMS) referred to the 
numbers of ‘Functional Nervous Disorders’ for psychological casualties.16 By the end of 1942 military 
medical authorities in 2NZEF and in New Zealand were using the term ‘anxiety neurosis’ or 
‘psychoneurosis’ as a formal diagnosis, often interchangeably, although DMS reports to the DGMS 
still quantified all men suffering any of these specific maladies under the heading of ‘Functional 
Nervous Disorders’, presumably for ease of collation.17 The symptoms and causes were identical to 
shell shock, but medical knowledge of the causes and course of the illness in the afflicted men had 
advanced since the beginning of the Great War. The part that fatigue played in the onset of mental 
breakdown in combat troops was now recognised and the creation of processes and treatment for 
physical exhaustion were put in place to avoid the onset of irredeemable mental breakdown.  
Anxiety Neurosis as a term did not take off in the public arena in the same manner as shell shock, 
although numbers of victims were generally comparable and the severity no less than that in the 
Great War. There was a more pragmatic approach to psychological casualties in World War Two due 
to a more realistic appreciation by military leadership of the mental stresses that combat soldiers 
would endure. In no way minimising the seriousness of their condition or needs, the return of 
‘mental’ casualties was not as much of a surprise to the community as a whole as it was in the Great 
War.  
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Chapter One. 
‘fled not bodily, to be sure, but spiritually, for their senses seemed to have 
left them...’1 
A  Brief History of Psychoneuroses before 1914. 
 
In 1980 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was included for the first time in the psychological 
diagnostic manual, DSM- III, as a generic term for mental disorders that result from exposure to 
traumatic events that cause mental disorders amongst participants and witnesses.2 PTSD 
encapsulated the various names that were previously used to describe the multitudinous 
physiological and psychological symptoms of stress reactions, both in civil and martial contexts. 
Symptoms of irregular or rapid heartbeat, inability to sleep, unresponsiveness, shivering, abnormal 
limb movements, tics or twitches, loss of selective sensory function, loss of speech, excessive 
nervousness, being easily startled and loss of appetite, amongst others, could present in any 
combination simultaneously in a patient.3 The variety of possible combinations of symptoms did not 
through earlier stages of history allow a definitive definition of the malady. The Great War was 
therefore the first instance in which sufficient numbers of victims were available to enable 
psychoneurosis to be studied in an organised manner and allow a fuller understanding of the illness. 
Understanding of psychoneurosis as a phenomenon during the Great War required the intersection 
of diverse areas of research and events, a meld that had not occurred until that time. Prior to the 
Great War each pioneering doctor was working in a field new to them and with only tenuous 
connection, if any, to any work carried out before them. Each ‘new’ discovery created different 
definitions and terminology and doctors, unaware of work being carried out by others, developed 
unique treatments for the combination of symptoms they found themselves confronted with in their 
individual situation. Doctors from each nation tended to focus on their own particular environments 
with no significant international collaboration, creating a multiple set of research areas that 
developed in isolation. Interaction between the threads of development of trauma terminology and 
treatment in the military context and the sometimes similar, and sometimes dissimilar, development 
in the public sphere also adds to the number of cords that are woven into the field. Interleaved 
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through the tangle of terminology and definition is the gradual general acceptance of the existence 
of a malady that leaves no physical wound but was nonetheless physically debilitating.  
References to specific stress reactions in soldiers can be found dating from the seventeenth century 
in literature and history. It is also possible to apply the vision of hindsight to many earlier literary 
works, ranging from Homer’s Iliad to the works of Shakespeare, which suggest references to PTSD 
from the descriptions of the thoughts and emotions of their protagonists. The haunting of soldiers 
reliving their experiences was commonly accepted in popular memory but has been assumed to 
centre on distaste at killing or death of comrades in horrible circumstances. The concept that a 
soldier could suffer psychological illness from their individual fear was counter to the heroic vision 
the public held of their own nation’s armed forces. Any such manifestations were ascribed to 
individual weakness or cowardice.  Men who had broken down under the stress of combat were 
often disgraced as deserters or cowards and dealt with through military disciplinary systems. 
Non-military references to suffering the after effects of traumatic incidents are not as commonly 
recorded. Samuel Pepys records in his diaries of his suffering ‘dreams of the fire’ in the months 
following the Great Fire of London in 1666.4 Later, Swiss doctor Johannes Hofer coined the term 
nostalgie, to describe a collection of symptoms including homesickness, melancholia, heart 
palpitations, stupor, fever and digestive tract problems amongst Swiss expatriates in Prussia and 
Austria.5 McCann notes that cases of crime by servant girls circa 1795 were attributed to nostalgia 
and or homesickness, an early instance of the recognition of a link between behaviour contrary to 
the norms of society and mental abnormality related to stress.6 Literacy and social status 
determined who wrote and what was written about so examples of such post-traumatic stress were 
therefore infrequent. It is not until the nineteenth century that references become more common in 
detailing PTSD-like symptoms in the public arena. This can be attributed to a combination of 
increases in literacy through the industrial age and the advent of the newspaper as a universal 
medium for the communication of ideas.  
Since growth of mass media through improved literacy and reduction in the cost of transmission of 
information, communication of ideas has increased exponentially, not only across class boundaries 
within nations, but also across international boundaries and classes. As a medium, however, the 
press is reliant on being able to distribute information that the public wants to see to survive 
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commercially. The reporting of conflicts, accidents and ‘the goings on’ of other people sells 
newspapers, leading to sensationalism to fit the public’s expectations. In this context the reporting 
of railway accidents, which were relatively common in the mid to late 1800’s in Britain, involved 
generally the middle and upper classes, as they were who could most easily afford to travel by train. 
Court cases relating to compensation from accidents therefore involved these classes and provided a 
useful object for the print media to sell.  
In the public arena the advent of passenger railway services from the 1830’s, and the accidents 
associated with an activity that was somewhat dangerous in its early years, exposed the general 
population to the possibility of the then ill-defined and awkwardly long-term disability known as 
‘Railway Spine’.  Railway Spine, so called because of debilitating aches in the back and neck that 
were common symptoms, was seen at the time as being ostensibly the result of the physical strain 
associated with a railway accident. This was not immediately connected with the visions of mutilated 
fellow passengers but attributed to the shock of sudden deceleration and erratic movement from 
railway cars behaving in an unnatural manner. Multiple claims for compensation from passengers 
involved in accidents led the railway companies to try to minimise losses by attempting to refute 
compensation claims where there was no obvious physical injury.7 By 1885, the medical profession 
had become divided on the concept of railway spine, with advocates determining it had physical or 
organic origins with ‘shock’ damage to the spinal nerve system and others believing it a more latent 
functional disorder. 8 The open argument regarding the physical or psychological origin of railway 
spine, often sensationalised by the print media due to the novelty of the railway, status of the 
passengers affected and the dramatic nature of railway accidents,  created in the public mind a 
picture of trauma resulting from adverse incidents.9 In Britain, in concurrence with the introduction 
of workmen’s compensation acts of the early 1900’s, which provided for injured industrial workers, 
suspicions created through the physical / psychological argument relating to the origin of railway 
spine was clouded by railway companies and their medical consultants through accusations of 
malingering or fraud on the part of claimants.10 This was mirrored in the United States, although 
more forcibly by the railway companies than in Britain, where emphasis was placed on repudiation 
of the need for compensation for psychological harm. Railway spine in any case placed the possibility 
into the public consciousness of being able to be mentally damaged as the result of being in an 
accident or witnessing one. 
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What we recognise now as psychoneurotic symptoms similar to those exhibited by soldiers in the 
Great War and World War Two were recorded as early as the middle of the 17th century. Amongst 
conscripted Spanish troops in Flanders it was recorded that some were in a state of ‘deep despair’, 
unfit for further service and having to be repatriated and discharged.11 French physicians during the 
Revolutionary Wars attempted to determine the causes of a maladie du pays which afflicted 
conscripts posted to camps far from their homes, noting that it affected country lads much more 
frequently than recruits from the cities. Incidences were common in all military camps over all of 
France, but French Army surgeons noted that rates reduced with French victories and rose during 
periods of military reverse.12 Major Cavalie Mercer of the Royal Horse Artillery mentions in his 
reminiscences of the Waterloo campaign a regiment of Brunswick infantry who would have ‘fled not 
bodily, to be sure, but spiritually, for their senses seemed to have left them...’ if their officers and 
sergeants had not physically held them in place.13 Mercer describes their somnambulant reactions to 
their situation under French artillery fire at Waterloo, which read now as classic symptoms of 
psychoneurosis. Mercer also recalled the same regiment fleeing in disorder at Quatre Bras the 
previous day.14 The dull reactions and sense of looming panic that afflicted the troops in the 
regiment as the unit’s leadership fought to keep their men in a semblance of control during 
prolonged periods of hostile fire are recognisable symptoms of psychoneurosis.  
 
From the end of the Napoleonic Wars, until the United States Civil War, ‘nostalgia’ as a mental 
disease seems to have become an exclusively civilian entity. The only major conflict between these 
two wars, the Crimean War, did not produce much recognisable evidence or comment regarding the 
mental breakdown of troops in battle conditions, despite the prolific public reporting that 
accompanied the campaign.15 Watson in ‘War on the Mind’ notes the rates of what he terms 
‘combat fatigue’ in the Franco-Prussian, Spanish-American and Boer Wars to be in the vicinity of two 
or three per 1000 serving troops.16 Edgar Jones notes in ‘History of Post-Combat Disorders’ the 
presence in Crimean War veterans of heart palpitations, later defined as Disordered Action of the 
Heart (DAH).17 DAH, colloquially known over the following decades as ‘soldier’s heart’ or Da Costa’s 
Syndrome in the United States was a significant medical factor in the American Civil War, causing the 
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hospitalisation and discharge of several thousand of Union soldiers.18 British forces in the Boer War 
had several thousand men rehabilitated and pensioned as a result of cardiac irregularities attributed 
to DAH. Originally thought to be caused by constriction of the chest by tight webbing straps of the 
soldier’s equipment, the connection between DAH and combat stress was not recognised until well 
into the Great War. Medical discharges from service for DAH were occurring in British and 
Commonwealth forces until late in the war, with cardiac specialists estimating that merely 10% of 
these discharges were actual cardiac problems and the balance were most likely to be psychological 
or psychosomatic.19 Whether DAH was used by doctors as an ‘honourable’ means of securing the 
discharge of psychological casualties is open to conjecture. 
In the United States the predominant focus on military psychology in the 19th century is the Civil 
War, with no mention in any literature reviewed of psychological issues during the Spanish-American 
or Indian Wars. Rosen indicates the re-emergence of ‘nostalgia’ as a battle wound in the U.S. Civil 
War but shows it described as a severe form of homesickness, rather than related to trauma or 
combat stress, which initiated a policy implimenting a minimum age for conscription and 
recruitment.20 Da Costa, writing in 1871, describes how he used a series of drugs to relax the over-
stimulated ‘special nerve centres’ at the base of the heart to cure men who exhibited heart 
palpitations, dizziness, fainting spells and shortness of breath.21 Shephard points out that the rest 
out of battle that accompanied the men’s treatment was probably more beneficial than the cocktail 
of narcotics Da Costa was plying them with.22 Da Casta assumed the cause of the heart palpitations 
was a form of infection, his reasoning reinforced by cases he observed in the civilian environment.23 
Accurate numbers of psychological casualties are unknown as nostalgia and Da Costa Syndrome 
were not recognised as purely psychological issues at the time, neither was the possibility of somatic 
illness.  
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The Time of Neurosis 
“…the nerves of modern men were often put to a heavier strain than nature 
intended them to bear.”24 
The official German medical history of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 dedicated one of its eight 
volumes to mental or nervous disorders, a strong indication that the issue was significant in the 
German army. Martin Lengwlier argues in ‘Psychiatry Beyond the Asylum’ that there was a symbiosis 
created between the German military and the psychiatric discipline in Wilhelmine Germany as the 
new medical discipline attempted to gain credibility in the martial society and found a connection 
with the prestige of the army a useful conduit.25 A sense of national unity resulting from the success 
of the 1870-71 war saw the army become embodied as the national standard of virility and strength. 
That the German soldier could be made neurotic as a result of their service was anathema to this 
concept and the psychiatric profession was able to gain professionally from the premise that those 
affected by war neuroses were already suffering from hereditary predisposition to mental illness. 
This theory also suited the army, which denied military service could cause mental illness. Industrial 
compensation was introduced in Germany in the 1870’s, long before Britain, and the medical issues 
surrounding entitlement for victims, noted previously, were correspondingly debated much earlier.26 
The involvement of psychiatry in the court system also increased following the unification, which 
had a corresponding influence on military courts, as judges, who had previously made their own 
assessments of the mental capacity of defendants, began to call on expert advice where 
psychological assessment was required of defendants.27  Compulsory military training for all German 
males provided a pool of men far in excess of the capacity of the army or the budget to 
accommodate them, in spite of expansion of the armed forces in the decades either side of the turn 
of the century. Thus, the army was able to select better potential candidates for recruitment and 
could afford to set higher standards than previously in recruit selection. As predisposition to 
neurosis was already considered the cause of the breakdown of men in war, rather than military 
service or war itself, psychological and mental capacity were determined as a component of the 
recruitment process, which included lists of released mental patients being provided to the military 
authorities.28 A symbiosis developed between military and civil psychiatry resulting from the view of 
                                                          
24
 Quoted from Spectator magazine, 1894, in Shephard, A War of Nerves, p. 7. 
25
 Martin Lengwiler, ‘Psychiatry beyond the Asylum: The Origins of German Military Psychiatry before World 
War 1’, History of Psychiatry (2003), 14:41, p. 47. 
26
 Shephard, A War of Nerves, p. 97 and Jan Goldstein, Console and Classify: The French Psychiatric Profession 
in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 346. 
27
 Richard F. Wetzell, ‘Psychiatry and Criminal Justice in Modern Germany, 1880-1933’,  Journal of European 
Studies, (2009), 39, p. 272. 
28
 Lengwiler, ‘Psychiatry beyond the Asylum’, p. 52. 
19 
 
neurosis as counter to the image within society of the ‘manliness and virility’ of the soldier which 
helped the emergence of psychiatry as a stand-alone discipline within medicine in Germany.29 Thus, 
in effect, psychiatry and psychology were a function of the state apparatus, upholding the ideal and 
showing deviancy from that standard as an individual matter and not as the result of experiences in 
the service of the state. 
The psychiatric environment in France through the nineteenth century was one of individual 
achievement and enterprise. Napoleonic laws forbidding associations unless under government 
surveillance made the formation of a medical association difficult and encouraged fragmentation, at 
least until after the upheavals of 1848.30 From its formation in 1847 the Société Médico-
Psychologique was ineffectual as an influence on the progress of psychiatry in France. The senior 
doctor in each of the institutions held sway and as the profession was based around these separate 
institutions there was little incentive for co-operation. This situation was still apparent in the early 
years of the 1914-1918 war, even though institutions were funded by the central government.31 
Defeat in the Franco-Prussian War was seen by the French as the result of inferior scientific 
achievement, where Germany had usurped France’s technological hegemony, creating an 
environment post - 1870 in which scientific advancement was nurtured. This allowed the 
introduction of new reforming ideas in the medical profession generally and went some way to 
breaking down the hold individual institutions had on psychiatric care, including neurasthenia and 
neurosis.32  However, in the period just prior to the Great War the French mental health 
environment was again factionalised, with the ‘patron and circle’ staffing system in institutions 
forming the core of each group proffering their own particular theories and remedies.33 This system 
created several different individualised theories in treatment that were carried out competitively in 
separate facilities, and were defined by the personal attributes and whims of the chief doctor of 
each school.  
Despite this fragmentation, the French were seen as leaders in the treatment of hysteria, mostly 
through the work of Jean-Martin Charcot, director of the Salpêtrière asylum in Paris for 30 years 
until his death in 1893. Charcot linked railway spine to hysteria and showed that hysteria as a 
disease could manifest in men where before it was seen as a purely female mental affliction. Charcot 
still saw the onset of hysteria as related to ‘inherited biological weakness’ but noted that the fear or 
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fright felt at the moment of the incident was an important part in the creation of the disease itself.34 
By recognising the genetic factor in the incidence of hysteria, Charcot attempted to explain the onset 
of disease in some victims and not in others. Both Babinski and Freud studied under Charcot in Paris. 
Babinski became influential in the treatment of French psychological casualties during the Great War 
and while Freud was less influential until after the war, outside Austria at least, his theories were 
significant in developing effective treatment for psychoneurosis following the 1930’s.35 
The differentiation of hysteria and neurosis in a gender context was a factor in inhibiting the 
development of psychological medicine in the British Army in the years between the Boer War and 
the Great War. Hysteria and neurasthenia were seen as female maladies in Britain despite debate 
resulting from Charcot’s work at the end of the previous century. Most British medical practitioners 
were distrustful of ‘continental’ medicine and treated the disease as hereditary, organic or 
environmental in origin, which basically tainted the patient with a hint of moral failure.36 At the 
same time, the staff and officers of the British Army were on the cusp of changes that would force 
alterations to their conception of military service and the army as a lifestyle. Tim Travers in ‘The 
Killing Ground’ argues that the Edwardian values imbued in the officer class, associated with 
inherent anti-intellectualism and social-Darwinist views, coloured their attitudes towards social class 
and values and made the officer class very conservative.37 Additionally, the sexual component of 
Freud’s theories offended Edwardian sensibilities so there was little support for this approach in 
British military or civilian psychiatric spheres. Military medicine was often the haven of those who 
could not survive in the realm of private medicine or were too young to be able to generate their 
own private clientele.38 The RAMC was a relatively new organisation within the army structure and 
was lacking the reputation and influence it later gained. As members of a male dominated social 
cohort that disdained intellectualism, women’s mental diseases were of no interest to army doctors 
and where mental illness was seen as somehow unmanly or showing a lack of the sense of duty 
expected of the British Soldier, there was no incentive to study psychology in a military setting.39 As 
such there was a tendency for military doctors to have little comprehension of the psychological 
issues confronted by troops in modern combat, in addition to pressure to conform to the demands 
of army policies relating to nervous disorders. Social Darwinism influenced their views of soldiers 
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recruited from working-class urban areas, who were seen as uncommitted to upholding the values 
of the British Empire and likely to surrender or sue for peace at the earliest opportunity.40  
 The observations of Anthony Bowlby while treating the sick and wounded from the Boer War does 
not seem to have been noticed widely. His work has subsequently been shown to be prescient in 
determining the psychosomatic characteristics of many of the symptoms shown in nervous cases, 
such as DAH, indicating continuous service in stressful situations can cause long term debilitation.41 
Bowlby recognised no difference between military and civilian neurasthenia he encountered, a 
recurring point throughout the history of the development of treatment of psychoneurosis and 
PTSD. The Boer War is the first major conflict where sufficiently accurate and complete records are 
kept for army personnel, allowing a reasonable analysis of the causes and outcomes of the illnesses 
and injuries troops were exposed to. Jones and Wessely’s survey of personnel records of soldiers 
discharged during or after the Boer War shows that of 6200 cases medically discharged, only 11 
cases were for actual psychological reasons (not including a further 26 discharged for psychosis or 
depression).42 However, another paper by the same authors showed a further 4305 soldiers 
returned home for rheumatism of 24,460 hospitalised, specifically pain in the joints and or 
headaches. 43 DAH or other heart ailments were another cause of hospitalisation or discharge during 
the South African conflict with 3461 soldiers hospitalised, of which 1489 were returned to Britain for 
discharge. The Royal Army Medical Corps units had very high comparative incidences of heart 
problems, thought at the time to be caused by ‘arduous route marches’, although the “ill-fed, 
anaemic and under-sized and somewhat neurotic lads, of which the larger cities produce so plentiful 
supply as compared with the sturdy, somewhat lethargic country lad” also seemed to produce a fair 
number of patients.44 Jones and Wessely argue that although there were documented examples of 
shell shock from the Boer War, as it was understood in the Great War, most of the soldiers 
discharged for non-battle wounds had somatised their trauma and were discharged for these 
symptoms.45 In any case the physiological symptoms of mental stress were treated, rather than the 
unrecognised psychological causes.  
By 1914 a pattern had developed between nations in the attitude and treatment of mental diseases 
in both a civilian and military context. The public, military and medical communities of Britain, 
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France, Germany and the United States each had their own individual national attitudes to mental 
health and the breakdown of soldiers in battle.46 Treatment in the early years of the Great War was 
accordingly ineffective and suited the preconceptions the medical fraternity held within each of 
those societies, compounded by the differing attitudes each nation’s military had of psychoneurosis. 
The Great War bought the presence of psychological casualties into the public consciousness in a 
manner that had not occurred in previous conflicts, both through the sheer numbers afflicted and 
the seeming randomness of possibility of falling victim to a psychoneurotic wound, irrespective of 
personal social status or history. Symptoms of psychoneurosis have been found in many old military 
writings, both contemporaneous with the conflict being described and in later reminiscences, 
though in most cases there has been little conformity in nomenclature and as little consistency in 
describing the symptoms themselves. In tracing psychoneurosis through past history the variety of 
terminology that arises in describing the symptoms makes the symptoms themselves the common 
link between the instances recorded over the years. Variety of symptoms and the number of 
combinations of these symptoms that are possible with psychoneurotic disease, coupled with the 
circumstances and timing of their presentation, make definition difficult in itself for modern writing, 
let alone recognition in historical works. 
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Chapter  Two 
Psychoneuroses in World War One 
“He could not walk in a straight line, he had violent trembling of the whole 
body with twitching.”1 
The Beginning of the War 
As this paper is focusing on the responses of New Zealand troops in World War Two to those 
amongst their comrades who manifested signs of nervous disorder, it is fitting that there is a 
concentration on the British and Dominion development of medicine in relation to psychoneurosis 
and post-traumatic stress. It is, however, impossible to isolate the Commonwealth when discussing 
the development of the science in relation to shell shock and cognizance must be taken of 
developments in other nations and any affects these have in relation to Britain and the Dominions. 
Each major nation had largely developed their own theories regarding neurosis, as outlined in the 
previous chapter, which influenced the manner in which each approached psychological casualties 
during the Great War. Recognition that the symptoms and onset of neuroses following trauma in a 
civilian setting were the same as that following exposure to combat was slow as it challenged 
preconceptions of mental illness in a military setting. The sheer numbers of psychological casualties 
that emerged from the Great War provided incentive, through necessity, to meld the military and 
civilian stands of theory together into a single conceptual entity.  
New Zealand military medicine was firmly rooted in the processes and institutions of the British 
army. After 1908, the New Zealand Medical Corps was organised on the lines of the RAMC and 
followed British practices in the processing and treatment of shell shocked men through the Great 
War. This had distinct advantages for New Zealand troops as they had access to resources, hospitals 
and expertise that would not otherwise be available. As a nation able to provide and support only a 
single infantry division New Zealand did not have the resources or expertise to provide completely 
independent logistical and administrative services, so was reliant on British Army resources. The 
medical and surgical personnel of the NZMC were not regular soldiers but peace-time doctors and 
surgeons who were members of the Territorial Forces or who had volunteered their services 
following the outbreak of war. Few if any military doctors had any specialist training in nervous 
disorders or mental diseases and any who had experience in psychology had gained that from their 
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own civilian practice.2 There was some effort to provide training in military medicine to the New 
Zealand Territorial Force medical staff before the war, but difficulties of geographical distance and 
the lack of a full time instructor in the NZMC restricted the effectiveness of any training.3  
Unlike the Territorial Forces which were the basis of the New Zealand Army, the British RAMC was a 
permanent arm of the army, formally established following the high disease rates experienced 
during the Boer War. However, the Medical Service in the British Army prior to the Great War 
emphasised welfare of the unit before the welfare of the men. The RAMC was a new organisation 
and did not have the tradition or access to the ‘old boy’s network’ that older arms of the services 
had developed.4 Also, before 1914, military medicine was often the haven of those who could not 
survive in private practice or were too young or inexperienced to be able to generate private 
clientele.5 Few if any military doctors had any specialist training in nervous disorders or mental 
diseases.6 Recruitment of ‘hostilities only’ medical staff following the outbreak of the war diluted the 
regular army medical officers with medical men who were less imbued with the attitudes of the old 
army and challenged existing attitudes, including those held towards psychological casualties.7 The 
extent to which this influx of new ideas is instrumental in affecting changes in attitude towards 
psychological casualties within the RAMC hierarchy is unclear. However, none of the leading experts 
in the psychological care of shell shocked patients throughout the Great War were regular army 
doctors.  
RAMC personnel at the start of the Great War considered neurosis in a civilian environment to be a 
different entity to the mental illness assaulting a soldier. Soldiers were expected to manfully face the 
dangers inherent in their calling and ‘do their bit’ for King and Country. To regular army doctor’s 
neurosis as a disease was akin to hysteria and therefore only concerned women and ‘effeminate’ 
men. Psychological training for army doctors was geared towards detecting malingering, which they 
were expected to report to their commanding officer’s.8 During the war, Medical Officers (MO) could 
be caught between the imperative of returning sick men to duty and their duty of care to their 
patients.9 Hostilities only doctors were more open to an assessment of conditions that was not 
tempered with the regular officer’s ingrained suspicion of the soldier’s propensity for shirking at any 
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opportunity, but while sympathetic military doctors did exist, they were pressured to conform to 
expected norms by the military hierarchy.10 The combination of limited specialist psychological 
training of medical officers and confrontation with an unknown phenomenon meant the initial 
response to ‘nervous’ casualties provoked a similar reaction to that of malingering and other 
disciplinary infractions.  
The British Army encountered combat related psychological casualties from as early as September 
1914 and by early 1915 they were presenting in numbers that exceeded expectations and 
understanding. The lessons from the Boer War were ignored or misunderstood by the army, as were 
reports from officers observing the Russo-Japanese War and the Balkans War of 1913.11 Initial 
treatment of those evacuated from France in 1914 was as if they were insane and psychological 
casualties were admitted to mental asylums which quickly filled to capacity.12 Causes were initially 
assumed to be the results of the concussive characteristics of high explosives acting on the nervous 
system, and the term ‘shell shock’ was coined from the assumption of ‘shock’ or concussion from 
the detonation of a shell damaging the nervous system.13 However men also appeared with similar 
symptoms that had not been in the proximity of shell-fire or near the front lines. The major issue in 
being unable to adequately explain shell shock, its causes and an effective treatment that satisfied 
the army was lack of agreement amongst psychologists as to which of the number of different and 
competing theories of its manifestation was accurate.14 Class prejudices, a characteristic of the pre-
war British Army, were challenged through both officers and other ranks falling victim, seemingly 
indiscriminately, whilst presenting similar symptoms. The army combined a traditional outlook that 
saw nervousness as a loss of moral control, with no definite understanding of the cause and 
treatment amongst the medical profession, and so continued treating shell shock victims with 
suspicion as potential malingerers.  
Until the end of 1915 there were contradictory definitions of ‘shell shock’ but there was tenuous 
agreement that the hysteria that accompanied it was a form of neurosis and could be treated as 
such, despite there being a number of divergent and often anachronistic opinions.15 Varied 
approaches were frequently centred on differences between psychiatry as practiced in existing 
mental institutions and the burgeoning support for a more psychoanalytical approach to shell shock 
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that gained reluctant acceptance as it showed more signs of successful treatment.16 In mid-1916, Dr 
Harold Wiltshire disproved the physical causation of shell shock and showed that there was a 
psychological cause, usually brought upon by cumulative mental strain and fatigue.17 The 
establishment of new facilities in Britain to accommodate the growing numbers of psychological 
casualties from France brought prominence to psychologists who were applying psychoanalytic 
methods with increasing success, such as Dr William Rivers at Maghull and Craiglockhart hospitals, 
and Dr Arthur Brock. Dr Rivers especially rose to prominence for his success with psychoanalytic 
treatments, but was considered by the regular RAMC as a ‘rebel’ for his methods.18 Rivers work was 
based on Freudian theory that shell shock was internal conflict in the mind of the patient, not based 
on sexual origins as per Freudian concepts, but on the conflict between the sense of duty held by the 
individual and the instinctive urge for self-preservation. This had several important ramifications. 
Edwardian sensibilities were no longer offended by the sexual component of psychoanalysis, 
removing some opposition to the theory and making it a more socially accepted practice. Linking 
shell shock to a mental conflict in the individual between self-preservation and a strong sense of 
duty made it less unappealing, especially to the families and relatives of victims and removed some 
of the stigma associated with mental illness.  
 
Medical Developments 
“(ii) Shell Shock, Shell Concussion, Neurasthenia, Inability to stand Shell Fire. 
These terms are not to be used under any circumstances. The diagnosis will 
be written "N.Y.D.N."”19 
 
The work published in 1915 by the American physiologist Walter Cannon on the endocrine system 
showed the effects hormones, especially adrenalin, had on the body when it feels itself in a state of 
danger. Physiological effects were increased heart rate, blood sugar levels and breathing rate, all of 
which are intended to enable the ‘fight or flight’ mechanism. Automatic production of adrenalin as 
part of the ‘fight or flight’ response, when coupled with the requirement to stay immobile under 
shelling and while fatigued, has been suggested as a major contributor to psychological 
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breakdown.20 A ‘hunt or be hunted’ situation created less psychological damage because it was a 
more natural event and the participant had a measure of control over their destiny. This proved 
evident particularly in rear echelon troops falling victim in numbers that matched or exceeded those 
of front line troops who had at least occasional opportunity to retaliate.21 In 1917, Dr F.W. Mott 
raised the question of what occurred in the mind and body when the body was unable to do either 
of these things, as when sheltering under shell fire for sustained periods of time.22 The lack of 
control over circumstances in time of acute stress accentuated the feeling of helplessness, creating 
mental trauma. Inability to react, to either move away from the danger or to remove the source of 
it, coupled with knowledge of the consequences of remaining in the danger zone was a major trigger 
for the onset of debilitation in many shell shock victims.23 Recognition of Wiltshire’s theory that the 
effects of poor food and conditions, fatigue and constant stress were contributing factors towards 
mental breakdown in soldiers made the term shell shock redundant in describing nervous disorders 
that afflicted troops.24 Shock was not strictly applicable in describing the effects of long term stress 
and physical deprivation that accompanied the normality of trench warfare for front line troops.   
In May 1916, Myers suggested the creation of specific treatment centres for psychological casualties 
in each Army Area to centralise the specialists separate severe and mild cases and avoid 
intermingling with the physically wounded in hospitals and clearing stations.25 Myers had toured 
French Army psychiatric treatment centres close behind their front lines, where men were kept 
under military discipline within the sound of the guns.26 The rates of return of men to their units 
were higher in the French system than that used in the British area of operations at that time. To 
overcome the initial resistance of British Army commanders, Myers used the argument that 
malingerers would be identified earlier in the treatment process and be returned to their units more 
quickly. Myers did not agree with the French methods, specifically their use of coercive persuasion 
as part of the treatment, based on the assumption that most, if not all, shell shocked men were 
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prolongateurs.27 But the positioning of treatment centres close to the front lines allowed the 
immediate treatment of milder cases and their return to their units after several days. Placing men 
in institutions was seen as legitimising their illness and recovery from institutionalised care was 
significantly lower than that of the forward treatment stations. Only cases that could not be dealt 
with at the forward treatment centres were sent further back to hospitals that were struggling with 
capacity.28 The introduction of Army Area treatment centres ensured a much higher rate of return of 
men to their units than previously achieved.29 The ‘PIE’ system (proximity, immediacy, expectancy) 
was utilised, soldiers being treated in ‘proximity’ to the front lines, ‘immediately’ they began to 
exhibit symptoms, and they were treated without allowing any ‘expectancy’ that they would be 
evacuated with physically wounded men.30 With minor modification this system became the basis 
for the treatment of psychological casualties in British and Commonwealth armies until the cessation 
of hostilities and again during World War Two.  
It is in early May 1916 that the term ‘exhaustion’ is used regularly for the first time to describe the 
condition of men who were deemed to be mildly shell shocked and by the end of 1916 the term 
‘shell shock’ was officially abolished for use by Regimental or other Medical Officers. Only specialists 
at the base hospitals were authorised to use shell shock as a diagnosis. This diagnosis was reserved 
for those men who were sent back to base hospitals as they were injured beyond the capacity of the 
forward treatment facilities to treat them effectively.31 Shell shock was replaced with terms such as 
‘functional nervous disorder’ and ‘war neurosis’.32 Medical officers were instructed to use ‘NYDN’ in 
their patient notes, as shorthand for ‘Not Yet Diagnosed, Nervous’, until a more formal diagnosis 
could be made at Neurological treatment centres.33 In any case the systems were designed to treat 
the symptoms, to keep as many men as possible in the lines rather than evacuate them. This created 
a situation where many men were discharged suffering untreated or semi-treated psychological 
effects of trauma in the belief that removal from the source of trauma would remove the 
problems.34 There was by the end of the Great War, however, a differentiation in meaning between 
the military, medical and public spheres of their understanding of the phenomena of shell shock 
which affected how it was perceived by each of these parties.  
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‘Wastage’ was the term used to describe the continual losses caused through the attrition of trench 
warfare in World War One. By 1916 shell shock cases were presenting at the level of 40% of casualty 
rates following heavy fighting in British forces.35 Aside from losses through major offensive and 
defensive battles, there were constant losses through the normal process of trench warfare as 
sniping, artillery, trench raids, sickness and aerial bombing took their toll. For British and Dominion 
commanders finding sufficient replacements began to be problematic. Psychological casualties 
proved a vexing problem as not only was a shell shock victim unable to take his place on the line or 
in his unit, he was seen as a source of disciplinary breakdown by being a poor example to his peers.36 
Incidences of shell shock were also considered as a sign of poor disciplinary control by junior 
officers.37 There was also found to be a connection between morale and the rate of incidence of 
shell shock in a unit as lowering morale increased numbers of men reporting psychological injury as 
well as higher sickness rates.  
The numbers of men being returned to England and the Dominions for psychological injuries or 
illness were high enough to force the subject to public attention. It was not only the lower ranks that 
were succumbing, i.e. the lower classes, but the sons of the upper classes and gentry, as officers, 
who suffered also. That it was affecting the so-called ‘ruling’ classes aided efforts to understand the 
illness as wealthier families were more able to exert pressure within the establishment to look for 
remedies. Minimisation of the issue of shell shock from both a disciplinary and a public relations 
viewpoint significantly altered the official attitude towards shell shock victims, influencing policies in 
dealing with repatriated casualties and treatment in field units and military hospitals.38 However, 
there was little change in the manner in which the army disciplinary system processed the men 
charged with desertion or cowardice. The disciplinary ramifications of shell shock in the British Army, 
and in the NZEF by association, were the result of the High Command fearing the use of 
psychological injury as a means of escape from duty and they therefore determined to make 
examples at regular intervals.39  
Shell shock as a term developed a popular meaning different to that intended by its originators once 
it entered the public domain. Proximity and ease of communications between England and the 
Western Front allowed a measure of public opinion to be inculcated in the views of British and 
Dominion troops in France. Relatives frequently sent newspapers and magazines to family serving 
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overseas or men maintained subscriptions to be delivered directly if their circumstances allowed.40 
The term shell shock had taken on a life of its own through dissemination in the public realm via 
newspapers and was used as a common catch-all to describe the hysteric and neurasthenic injuries 
suffered by the wounded repatriated home. References and articles in print media relating to shell 
shock as a term and as a phenomenon for the first years of the war meant a familiarity with it was 
exhibited by the later drafts sent to France from Britain and the Dominions.41 New Zealand troops 
were also aware of the possibility of psychological damage through publication in local newspapers 
of articles describing the effects and symptoms of shell shock as a form of wound. Even before the 
end of the Gallipoli campaign articles were printed in New Zealand newspapers explaining the 
causes, as understood at the time, of shell-shock and its effects and treatment.42 The New Zealand 
Division was using the term shell shock in its own manner by the time it had reached the Western 
Front through the sanctioned magazine Shell-Shocks - New Zealanders in France.43 Shell-Shocks 
indicated the shift of the term ‘shell shock’ from purely medical use into the vernacular of the troops 
which coincided with the usage by people at home, tinged with the irreverence associated with 
military humour.44 Public familiarity with the term shell shock, and often personal acquaintance with 
repatriated victims, differentiated the victims from those who suffered mental disease in the 
community.45 Public attitudes to victims of psychological wounds ensured they were looked at with 
significantly more sympathy than mental patients and the sense of shame or condemnation 
associated with having relatives suffer mental disease in the community was not present to the 
same extent with shell shock victims.46 Associations and societies representing returned servicemen 
attempted to ensure that mentally wounded men were not thrown into the New Zealand mental 
health system without support or aid from these societies or their families.47 There remained, 
despite the removal of ‘Lunatic’ and ‘Asylum’ as official terms following the Mental Defectives Act of 
1911, use of the words as headlines in newspapers and terms in the community, indicating  the 
existence of the stigma associated with mental illness in New Zealand.48 Later drafts of troops from 
New Zealand had ample opportunity to become acquainted with the meaning of ‘shell shock’ 
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through the media which contributed to a different attitude towards psychological casualties than 
towards mental patients in asylums in New Zealand. 
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Chapter Three 
Attitudes to Psychological Casualties in New Zealand Combat Units in World 
War One. 
 “The stress of living here is so great upon a man that it is difficult to say if 
after the war he can recover completely his previous state of health.”1 
This chapter examines the attitudes of New Zealand soldiers towards psychological casualties in the 
Great War. That some could not cope mentally with the stress of combat, or even the thought of 
combat in some cases, was only reluctantly acknowledged publicly by military authorities. Military 
leadership that had obtained its martial experience in conflicts that did not include industrial 
methods of warfare considered the advent of psychological casualties within the frame of reference 
of their own exposure to combat. Their experience saw men breaking down as either a physical 
injury or a moral failure, therefore mental breakdown was a moral failure and should be subject to 
military discipline. The fact that psychological casualties would occur whatever measures were taken 
in prevention, process and treatment was only slowly acknowledged in British and Dominion forces. 
A belief that neuroses and fear in soldiers was ‘unmanly’ persisted through the greater part of the 
war and deterrence through the military disciplinary process was often resorted to. However, those 
exposed to the stress of combat in the New Zealand Division recognised that there was no moral 
component in the process of mental breakdown; that it was possible for any man to eventually 
succumb to the mental pressure of warfare. The differences between the expected view of what the 
soldier thought of psychological casualties and what they actually did think of them is the focus of 
this chapter. 
The British regimental system by its nature instilled esprit de corps in the members of each unit. The 
long history of regiments in the British Army was celebrated through memorial days, traditions and 
parading of battle honours that increased the sense of pride the soldier had in belonging to his unit. 
The officer corps was made up from the public schools and the upper classes (with only a few 
exceptions – some of which were notable) and was very conservative in nature. In the years 
immediately before the Great War there was an impetus for change to accommodate modern 
weaponry and tactics but the officer corps remained essentially based in traditional methods and 
ethos.2 The Victorian and later the Edwardian vision required officers to be gentlemen and have high 
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moral standards, epitomising the chivalric virtues and mores. The disadvantage of the regimental 
system was twofold; tradition inspired resistance to change in doctrine and maintenance of unit 
standards and traditions was difficult in periods of heavy casualties requiring constant replacements. 
In a New Zealand context the regimental system was based around the geographically recruited 
Territorial unit, with each regiment in the 1st New Zealand Division originating from a single 
recruiting area, Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury or Otago. The New Zealand system had more 
similarity to the British Kitchener Army, made up of volunteer units created from geographical 
regions than to the British regular regiments. As a new unit created since the outbreak of the war 
there was not the old tradition that restricted the outlook of the officers or instilled unwarranted 
discipline on the men.    
Popular memory in New Zealand has lionised the Anzac as the epitome of the nation’s manhood, but 
there was also a legacy of physical and mental injury that healed only slowly, which reinforced the 
public vision of the sacrifice made by New Zealand soldiers.3 Few veterans talked about their 
experiences with any other than their fellow soldiers after returning home, feeling only those who 
were there would understand.4 The introduction to The Great Adventure notes the heroic was 
emphasised in writings and memorials eulogising the actions and suffering of New Zealanders in the 
Great War and realities of war were buried beneath nationalistic fanfare that accompanied the 
triumphant return of soldiers.5 This is borne out by the carefully restrained rhetoric contained in the 
Official Unit Histories published in the years following the Great War, which remained the only 
openly available source of information regarding New Zealand units during the war until the end of 
the following decade. The absence of words from the veterans themselves did nothing to counter 
the strength of the public legend that had grown enough to later withstand modification that more 
reflected the realities of the war.6 The reluctance of veterans to talk about their experiences was a 
result of their inability to adequately describe the realities of their war to those who had not seen it 
themselves. They retreated into association with their own kind, those who had shared the 
ghastliness of their time and understood why they did not want to talk about it.7 Lack of personal 
stories meant the enduring view of ‘shell shock’ in the public memory as a legacy of the Great War 
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was often derived from literary sources, and then only long after the men had returned and often 
after time was beginning to take its inexorable toll.8  
The experience of soldiering in the Great War is not extensively understood by most New 
Zealanders. Psychological trauma as an inherent part of Great War combat experience had not 
appeared on the same scale and frequency in any conflict New Zealand had been involved in prior to 
1914 and so was little understood by New Zealand’s public and military.9 Newspaper articles and the 
return of troops suffering psychological trauma informed many New Zealanders about the condition 
of shell shock relatively early in the war, with many later newspaper articles discussing the various 
treatments and theories that were developing in Britain and France. For example the two following 
excerpts from newspapers in September 1915 show the methods used to treat shell shock victims at 
the time. “The problem is psychological and clearly demands the most careful and minute study of 
the evolution of character.”10 Also, “As the hypnotic treatment quite failed to improve the patient’s 
memory when not in a state of hypnosis, it was discontinued.”11 Later Reinforcements to the New 
Zealand Division in France were aware of the public conception of shell shock, if not the conditions 
in which it would manifest itself. 
 Coupled with censorship, the small town nature of New Zealand in the early twentieth century - 
where it was likely that a whole community would hear news from the letters of their overseas 
troops and where letters were sometimes published in local newspapers –meant few soldiers wrote 
critically of their companions in case of offence to relatives.12 Even these, however, must be viewed 
with the realisation that many men would write in tones reassuring to their families and would spare 
the reader the more unpleasant details of their experiences. Also, a natural reticence in discussing 
highly personal issues of comrades in arms means there are few references to the thoughts of the 
writer about the mental health of a companion. Similar to issues like prostitution, venereal disease 
and alcoholism in the service, shell shock has only recently been openly discussed in any great depth 
in relation to the legend of the Anzac. As with letter writers from the NZEF, interviewees in oral 
history collections can also be influenced in what they reveal in attempting not to offend the 
sensibilities of relatives and friends or upset public memory of past events and legends.13 However, 
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Liddle and Richardson emphasise that oral histories do give a different insight into the events of the 
past by revealing nuances that are not possible to obtain through standard historical writing.14 While 
acknowledging the limitations of researching and writing about comrades succumbing to shell shock, 
in relation to the sensibilities often felt by the storyteller, there is, nonetheless, sufficient material 
available to gain an insight into the views soldiers had towards their friends falling victim to mental 
collapse.  
There is an assumption that shell shock and war neurosis encountered by New Zealanders during 
wartime was identical to the condition experienced by other Commonwealth and British Empire 
military forces. There is nothing to suggest that this is incorrect. What differed in the New Zealand 
experience is the manner in which it was managed and how it was seen by New Zealanders, both on 
active service and at home. Great War historiography discussing shell shock generally focuses on its 
onset, developments in diagnosis and treatment, treatment of victims and the permutations of the 
official views. There is a strong component of social responsibility towards treatment and care of 
victims following their demobilisation and the cessation of hostilities. Peter Leese’s Shell Shock: 
Traumatic Neuroses and the British Soldiers of the First World War is a comprehensive examination 
of the treatment of British soldiers, political infighting and the medical machinations that 
accompanied the development of treatment. Leese comments that soldiers ‘intuitively’ understood 
the psychological ramifications of warfare but could not help looking on shell shock as a ‘shameful 
condition’ whereby victims had ‘let down’ their comrades. The guilt arising from this sense of shame 
ensured psychological casualties did not communicate their issues and suffered in silence.15 Joanna 
Bourke has written extensively on fear and trauma in the context of war and life. Dismembering the 
Male, examines how the British view of masculinity was altered through the crucible of the Great 
War and at the contest between officialdom and casualty in legitimising shell shock as a war 
wound.16 Her article ‘Effeminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma: The Sufferings of ‘Shell-shocked’ 
Men in Great Britain and Ireland, 1914-1939’ treats the onset of shell shock as a reaction to the 
inability to ‘get back’ at the enemy when under fire or alternatively submitting to aggression and 
then being unable to cope mentally with killing. Like Leese in Shell Shock, Bourke touches on the 
sense of shame felt by shell shock victims and the ‘unmanly’ way they felt at being unable to cope 
with combat and letting their comrades down.17 Bourke further argues in Fear: A Cultural History, 
that suppression of the ‘fight or flight’ instinct contributes to anxiety neuroses and shell shock 
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symptoms.18 While Bourke deeply examines aspects of the causes and manifestations of shell shock 
and anxiety neuroses there is little in her work illuminating the attitude of comrades to shell shock 
victims. Michael Roper’s The Secret Battle: Emotional Survival in the Great War is a close 
examination of the means by which British troops coped with the mental stresses of the Great 
War.19 However, none of these works look in any detail at the attitude of the individual soldier to 
victims of shell shock.  
Publications relating to the experience of New Zealand troops in the First World War have not 
extensively dealt with shell shock or how troops viewed it. Little writing has sought to understand 
the changes in the minds of soldiers under the conditions of combat in a New Zealand context, 
barely challenging the mythical aura surrounding the invincibility of the Anzac. Jock Phillips’ A Man’s 
Country peels away some myths surrounding the virtue of New Zealand soldiers overseas to frankly 
discuss drunkenness and sexual behaviour during the war but makes only passing mention of shell 
shock.20 Christopher Pugsley’s Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story mentions the psychological cost of 
New Zealand’s involvement in the Dardanelles campaign almost as an afterthought. However, in an 
illuminating passage Pugsley relates the bitterness of the broken men returning home to a country, 
for which they had helped create an identity, the fruits of which they were unable to partake of due 
to their need to recover from the effort, and this is the reason he ascribes for the silence of veterans 
in the following years.21 Pugsley deals with discipline and desertion in On the Fringe of Hell: New 
Zealanders and Discipline in the First World War and touches on shell shock but not the attitudes of 
individual soldiers to its affects and what they saw it as, although the dichotomy between the views 
of army authority and the reality of trench warfare is starkly contrasted in relating the execution of 
shell-shocked Victor Spencer for desertion in 1918.22 The extent to which there were similarities 
between the official view of shell shocked soldiers and the view of the soldiers serving with these 
men has not been examined in any detail in a New Zealand context. Examination of letters and 
diaries of New Zealand troops reveals a different attitude to shell shock than is seen through works 
examining the official and army medical views. Bourke and Leese mention a sense of shame felt by 
shell shock victims that they had ‘let the side down’ but this is not reciprocated in the writings of 
their comrades. Mostly, as will be demonstrated below, front line troops viewed the psychologically 
wounded with empathy and envy; empathy or pity for their condition and envy that they were 
getting out of the front lines.  
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There was an element of surprise amongst senior New Zealand commanders and medical personnel 
in Gallipoli at the discovery that New Zealand soldiers were breaking down mentally, although there 
were psychological casualties in the BEF being evacuated from France as early as September 1914 
and mental casualties among French and British troops in Cape Helles in the Gallipoli campaign.  
Writings from Gallipoli that described the psychological casualties amongst New Zealanders in the 
campaign do not use any of the medical terms that were in use in France by mid-1915. Charles 
Myers was using the term shell shock in February 1915 in an article published in the ‘Lancet’ and 
describing the symptoms as ‘functional dissociation’.23 A Regimental Medical Officer (RMO) 
described the condition of a soldier at Anzac Cove in August 1915, noting,  
  "Private … aged 18 undersized, was in one attack on the afternoon of the 26th [Hill 60]. He 
 went forward with his platoon commander and 10 men. They took cover under a 
 hedge" [probably the boy's statement] "the officer told them to fire a few rounds but 
 private… could not discharge his rifle, nor even put it to his shoulder; he  was told by his 
 officer to crawl back, which he did. On the evening of the 28th his pulse was 120 his 
 temperature 100 degrees. He could not walk in a straight line, he had violent trembling of 
 the whole body with twitching. He was holding both hands tightly clenched together and on 
 making him loosen them they both shook violently. He cannot sleep, every shot makes him 
 jump or twitch; he says he can never face fire again. This boy may be called a coward, but it 
 is to be noted that he advanced under heavy machine gun fire and did not retire until 
 ordered. I believe his nervous system, like his body, weak in the first place, has been 
 permanently shattered."24 
Writing as if he is encountering an unknown condition, this RMO is not using terminology associated 
with functional nervous disorders or other neuroses. In many ways this separate ‘discovery’ 
encapsulates the diversity of opinion and multiplicity of the sources of knowledge surrounding shell 
shock that delayed a definitive medical approach to treatment. 
The extent to which knowledge of shell shock was officially imparted through the New Zealand 
Division is questioned in a 1988 interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence Morris Blyth, who 
began his war in 1916 as an enlisted man in the New Zealand Rifle Brigade during the Somme 
campaign. When asked if he was aware of shell shock during the war he replied: ‘No I don’t think I 
was. Not immediately during the war, but... right after the war, when we could sort of think and look 
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around’.25 This response suggests there was no official information given to men in the ranks and 
that if information about shell shock was available in the newspapers in New Zealand it was not 
universally or officially disseminated. In light of the distribution of the division magazine Shell Shocks 
and the time Blyth spent in the front where men definitely did succumb to shell shock, to profess no 
knowledge of shell shock as a possibility in combat raises the question of whether his recollection 
was related purely to official information he received. That information was not provided to troops 
relating to the possibilities of psychological injury is not unexpected in consideration of the 
reluctance of military authorities to legitimise any method of a man being able to remove himself 
from his unit. Other comments made during the interviews, noted below, indicate Blyth believes he 
had an understanding of the causes of shell shock and its spread that show more than a rudimentary 
knowledge during his time in the lines. 
Simplistic familiarity amongst troops with the term shell shock and its symptoms through the 
medium of newspapers inevitably created concern amongst authorities that incidences of 
malingering through shell shock would increase. The army considered this more likely amongst units 
where discipline, morale or esprit de corps was weak.26 Charles Myers refers in Shell Shock in France 
1914-18 to complaints by medical officers where individuals used shell shock as a reason to avoid 
duty. Myers’ calls in 1916 for the abolition of the term ‘shell shock’ coincided with the army’s 
realisation it needed to tighten discipline to minimise the spread of shell shock, as a disease, through 
units.27 Malingering and cowardice were anathema to discipline, and there was a tendency for 
authorities to ascribe shell shock to avoidance of duty. There was concern that ‘shell shock’ was 
contagious and that ‘hysteria’ could be transferred from man to man throughout a unit. Witnesses 
to the 1922 War Office Inquiry into Shell Shock under Lord Southborough referred to how poor 
discipline and a tendency for shell shock to occur in ‘clusters’ in units highlighted the army’s view 
that shell shock was a weakness within a unit rather than as a hazard of war.28 The need to keep 
units up to strength, especially in periods where there were heavy losses, made the removal of men 
from fighting units who had no physical injury an action to be discouraged. The possibility that 
psychological trauma not accompanying physical injury could be categorised as a legitimate war 
wound was only recognised very reluctantly by the military hierarchy. Officially, therefore, shell 
shock remained a condition able to be manipulated into an escape from combat for the weak, 
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fearful or ‘unmanly’ and an indication of poor unit discipline.29 Generals were responsible for 
keeping as many men as possible in combat and military discipline was used to make examples of 
those who failed to fulfil their orders.30 Shell shock was not an accepted excuse or mitigating factor 
for desertion or other military crimes.   
During the Great War the NZEF followed the British Army in organisational and disciplinary practice. 
The NZMC was developed on closely similar lines to the RAMC following a 1908 review of medical 
services to the New Zealand Contingent in the Boer War. Psychiatric treatment of NZEF psychological 
casualties during the Great War also followed the British model, with a reliance on British resources 
in treatment and processes until patients were repatriated.31 Official reluctance to release men from 
combat required medical officers to follow strict guidelines in treating psychological casualties, 
meaning sick men were kept in their units and not evacuated for treatment. Pugsley notes the view 
of British commanders in 1916 was that disciplinary measures were to be applied wherever possible 
to those who had “medical diagnoses of ‘Shell shock’ or ‘Neurasthenia’ or ‘Inability to stand shell 
fire’.”32 Leese notes that military commanders and senior medical officers “rejected” shell shock 
because of the threat to discipline and the effect it would have on morale in small units and the 
army as a whole.33 Pugsley observes that by 1917 the French Army was suffering from outbreaks of 
mutiny in combat units following the failed Nivelle offensives and that the British High Command 
was resorting to harsher disciplinary measures against deserters and malingers to avoid mutiny 
spreading into British and Dominion armies.34 Copying the British model for management of 
psychological casualties, the ADMS for the NZEF adopted a restrictive definition of shell shock, 
instructing medical officers that physical damage conducive to proximity to explosives must exist for 
an individual to be suffering legitimate psychological damage.35 This attitude is criticised in The New 
Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918 as being contrary to best medical practice and 
Carbery goes further in noting that the premise that shell shock required injury was disproved by 
Wilshire by the beginning of 1916, prior to the ADMS issuing this restrictive policy.36 The men 
retained had to be utilised in any way possible, allocating psychologically damaged men to support 
or logistics roles less onerous than full duty. However, this was done in an ad hoc manner dependent 
on each unit’s circumstances and the personal attitudes of commanding officers.  
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Shame 
“…seems afraid of himself that he will not be able to hang out’.”37 
Army command, at best, saw shell shock as a nuisance and threat to discipline and at worst as an 
opportunity for malingering and cowardice. Shephard quotes Sir Hubert Gough, the Reserve Army 
Commander in 1916, as saying that it was “inconceivable” that men could “degrade themselves” and 
show an “utter want of manly spirit and courage” by succumbing to shell shock.38 Anzac 
commanders, as early as August 1915, had concern about the number of fighting men unable to 
function effectively but not ill enough to be evacuated.39 In Gallipoli manpower was an issue and in 
France maintenance of discipline and morale was an additional concern. A means by which the army 
attempted to counter shell shock was through instillation or reinforcement of ‘masculine virtues’ 
which bonded the individual soldier to their comrades.40 Bourke in Dismembering the Male indicates 
that pride in the reputation of one’s unit was a means of keeping soldiers from desertion or self-
mutilation.41 This translated into a pride in being a New Zealander in the NZEF and this was used by 
General Andrew Russell as a means of engendering spirit de corps, and in an attempt to make 
‘shirking’ a transgression against the group as a whole.42  
Leese writes that both army authorities and individual soldiers saw shell shock, or any form of 
mental disintegration, as shameful.43 Shame is a common emotion in psychological casualties, from 
the thought that through some form of personal weakness the victim has let their friends down. 
Shame was a response encouraged as a traditional means of pressure originating from within the 
unit in maintaining conformance to the standards of the group and to maintain unit cohesion and 
discipline. There is, therefore, evidence that the use by senior officers of esprit de corps and 
discipline as a means of minimising psychological casualties was manifested by utilising an 
individual’s sense of shame.44 The realities of combat however, proved that shame, as well as 
disciplinary measures, were ineffective in preventing psychological casualties.  
Soldiers treated shell shock as a normal hazard of combat in the Great War. It was considered that 
there was no less of a chance of breaking down mentally than there was of being killed or wounded 
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by enemy fire. There was a sense of normalcy about the possibility of a psychological wound in the 
circumstances of trench warfare and victims were treated no differently by the men in the lines than 
were the physically wounded. Desertion or self-inflicted wounds were a desperate resort but these 
were counter to the instincts of most men, whose comradeship and sense of duty kept them in their 
units. Therefore the shame of letting their friends down meant that a wound was the only chance of 
respite from the situation in which they found themselves. In Troop Morale and Popular Culture in 
the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918, Fuller discusses the bonds that held a man to his unit, 
wherein membership in a group became the overriding means of keeping men in the lines in order 
not to let the group down.45 Leaving the lines without a physical wound caused shame in the 
individual who was leaving the group unit to carry on without him. However, there is evidence to 
suggest that any sense of shame was held only by the psychological casualty, and was not 
necessarily reciprocated by those left in the lines. It was recognised that all men have a breaking 
point and that the conditions of war pushed men to that point. Pugsley quotes the diary of Captain 
G. A. Tuck of the Auckland Infantry Battalion: “tis[sic] a knowledge of these things, and of seeing 
good men flinch... when their nerve is gone – that hangs like a waiting beast on its opportunity”.46 
The arbitrary nature of the onset of shell shock precluded holding individuals in contempt for 
breaking down as there was a probability that any individual could succumb at any time.  
The attitudes of soldiers to psychological casualties were generally sympathetic on the basis that in 
the front line there was as much chance of one man getting wounded, in whatever manner, as 
another. Captain Harry Dansey writes in 1917, to his fiancé: “The very idea of returning home broken 
down in health & perhaps in spirits too are conditions I sometimes dwell upon with feelings of 
profound dread... I have been more than fortunate certainly for had I not come to the corps I must 
have broken down in the trenches.”47 Dansey continually exhibits a high moral stance and often 
seems to be pleased that he has not lowered his personal standards. For him to determine that he is 
potentially able to become broken in health or spirit, the same as the next man, gives an indication 
of the frequency and normality of the possibility of succumbing to shell shock.  Also in 1917, but 
prior to Passchendaele, Lieutenant Walter Horne writes to his family of being sent to a rest home for 
‘war worn officers’ after being on the ‘border of collapse’: 
 “Word came through Brigade that two war worn officers were to be sent here for a 
 couple of days spell each & as two were expecting to go on leave shortly, it fell to Mr 
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 Ashbys & my lot to come here & as we were both on the border of collapse (?) [sic] We 
 tossed for it & I lost so he has been down for his & gone back & now I am here. I thought it 
 would be a good chance to get through some of my correspondence…”48 
 While Horne is being slightly ironic in tone in this letter, he indicates no shame nor is he indignant 
that he was judged as mentally ‘collapsing’. There is a matter of fact tone in his writing in relation to 
combat stress, even when making allowances for the possibility he is sparing his family’s feelings by 
making light of his situation. Lance Corporal Henry Thomas Norton of the Otago Infantry Regiment 
writes in July 1916, of Dan Flour ‘cracking up’. “He has not got strong nerves & is highly strung. I feel 
so sorry for him, poor beggar he tries hard to hide it”.49 Norton himself holds a positive attitude and 
a determination to fight the enemy. He notes with sympathy the breakdown of his friend and the 
lack of help he received from the officers of his unit, who themselves were newly arrived in France 
and do not know Dan Flour or his past record. Corporal Claude Wysocki of the 2nd Rifle Brigade said 
when interviewed in 1988 that “You often heard instances of chaps you knew go fairly off the 
rocker.”50 Wysocki is describing the means by which his unit dealt with a shell shocked soldier: “They 
didn’t know what to do with Cormack. Cormack was given the job of batman to Major Murphy.... 
They eventually did the right thing and sent him back to base.”51 Assigning Cormack to a relatively 
soft role as batman rather than initiating harsher measures suggests there was sympathy towards 
afflicted men. Horne also writes sympathetically of his friend Herb Bellamy in December 1916, who 
“cannot get some of the sights of the push off his mind & seems afraid of himself that he will not be 
able to hang out”.52 There is no condemnation of psychological casualties from any of the men 
writing to their families or friends and the possibility of succumbing to shell shock is treated as a fact 
of life by those under bombardment.         
 
 
 
 
Envy 
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“Cheero, and long live the men who go home with neuralgia.”53 
Letters from junior officers and enlisted men who were in the front lines suggest there was no 
difference in the way they felt about the ‘luck’ of men getting a ‘blighty’ wound compared to shell 
shocked men being evacuated. The tone of soldiers referring to those sent home for psychological 
wounds, in fact most wounds, was almost one of envy that they had managed to ‘work’ their 
passage out of battle. Horne wrote: “When a man hears of a chap being sent to N.Z. it almost makes 
him envy him his weak constitution”.54 The concept of envying the wounded was not uncommon in 
men looking to get away from the stress and horror of combat. Bourke quotes British soldier Bert 
Conn stating in his memoirs that: “many men would willingly have sacrificed an arm or leg to have 
been able to get out of it.”55 Dansey writes to his fiancé in June 1918, following the German 
offensive, that “as you said in one of your letters “everything seems so wired up”. It is no wonder 
many valiant fellow [sic] loses his power of reason & it is much easier sometimes to die than to live. 
Certainly oblivion is a veritable paradise to many.”56 While hoping for death was an extreme 
response, there was nevertheless often envy on the part of those troops remaining behind for those 
who had sustained a ‘blighty’, a wound or illness serious enough to require repatriation home but 
not severe enough to seriously or permanently incapacitate the man. Considering Dansey is writing 
to someone whom he presumably wants to see him as manly and valiant, for him to write of others 
contemplating ending their own lives rather than carry on in the circumstances, shows how 
wretched the situation had become, and that getting a ‘blighty’ was considered a comparatively 
good way out. Private Morton of 2nd Wellington Infantry Regiment writes in October 1918, of his pal 
Frank Andrews being repatriated to New Zealand: “I believe he worked it on his heart” and “the last 
time I was with him there did not seem much wrong. Good luck to him anyhow and I hope I will soon 
be able to follow his lead.”57 Envy at leaving France is obvious, despite the serious nature of the 
illness Andrews suffered. Owen alludes to this in ‘The Chances’ with the lines “Now me, I wasn't 
scratched, praise God Almighty, (Though next time please I'll thank 'im for a blighty).”58 Horne writes 
a passage in December 1916 that encapsulates a range of the views inherent in the writings of 
troops who are there to do what they see as their duty but would be happy to be elsewhere: 
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 “but I suppose we ought to be jolly glad we are strong enough to do some more for the 
 country but when you sit in the bottom of a trench when theres [sic] a strafe on  you feel 
 inclined to envy a crossing guard or anybody at all as long as hes [sic] out of it.”59 
 
A soldier’s compulsion to remain in the face of danger was explained through the desire of the 
individual not to forfeit the sense of belonging they felt as part of a group unit and betray the trust 
of their comrades. If a man had shown he was willing to face the dangers the group was subjected to 
he was treated with understanding and sympathy if he broke down. Those that did not attempt to 
do their duty, by contrast, were condemned by their peers. Dansey writes of his disdain for 
stragglers in a letter in April 1918, “Stragglers... are men who in times of stress are found with their 
backs to the enemy... while those who do their duty are left to fight or die.”60 In this instance Dansey 
is discussing British troops retreating during the Kaiserschlacht of March and April 1918. In the same 
passage Dansey also notes; “there were four N.Z’ders [sic] & when trial [sic] by Court Martial were 
let off because it was a legitimate case of losing their whereabouts.” In this letter Dansey writes of 
the poor material the British Army was enlisting at that stage of the war, making a poor comparison 
to colonial troops in France. Those who carried on despite their fear were not derided but looked at 
with sympathy. Martin Brown of the Auckland Infantry Battalion writes to his mother that he felt 
“[it] was really grand to see the way some fellows...although frightened and nervous do their best to 
disguise the fact and carry on to the best of their ability.”61 In conjunction with the attitude that men 
can break mentally at any time under the stress of combat there was no shame directed at those 
who could not stand the strain as long as they attempted to do so and took their chance the same as 
those they left in the lines. 
William Hutchison, interviewed in 1988, relates how he was pushed into reporting sick by his gun 
crew and resisted because of the number of physically wounded men there were at the dressing 
station at that time. This followed an action as Hutchinson relates that there was a ‘fifty yard’ line of 
stretchers outside forward dressing station. “Well I couldn’t very well push my frame in and say hey 
what’s wrong with me? But it was obvious to the rest of the crew that there was something wrong 
with me.”62 Dansey refers to a Captain Ball breaking down after a short time in France and being 
surprised as “I felt quite sure he would be quite a success”, then notes that it is “exceedingly strange 
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how men from whom one would naturally expect to do well in war fail dismally” and “others who in 
peace days receive but the most uncharitable comments become moral giants.”63 Private Wilfred 
Davies of the Otago Regiment recalls in an interview in 1988 “some chaps couldn’t take it like others 
you could see. Well it didn’t affect me... I used to get a bit scared”.64 Davies hints at being a little 
pleased that he was not afflicted but shows no contempt for those that did suffer. None of these 
men recorded exhibiting any approbation towards their companions if they broke down after a 
period of action.  
The army attempted to weed out the mentally unfit during the recruit training process to avoid 
placing psychologically unsuitable individuals in combat units, within the constraint of the constant 
need for reinforcements. The vetting process was not always effective and some unsuitable men 
were sent overseas as they had not broken down in New Zealand or were included as they were 
needed to make up numbers.65 British psychological medical practices initially differed in the 
treatment of officers and men, as they did in the New Zealand forces, where social class 
differentiated diagnoses and treatment, leaving the probability that treatment  was dependent on a 
man’s social position prior to the war.66 Attempting to translate traits and personality prior to 
military service into the likelihood of succumbing to war neuroses was a process tinged with ‘socio-
cultural’ subjectivity.67 This contrasts with ordinary soldiers who believed that any man could fail 
dependent on the circumstances in which they found themselves. Notwithstanding this, there are 
several references in letters to ‘highly strung’ people being susceptible to psychological trauma, 
where they were known to the writer before combat or enlistment. Tahu Rhodes, a staff officer in 
New Zealand division Headquarters writing to his mother in January 1917 about the repatriation of 
his friend Charlie Shaw, notes that ‘I don’t think war suits very musical people, they are too highly 
strung for it.’68 Myers suggested that men who had a ‘feebler intellect’ had less resistance to 
emotional stress than the ‘highly intelligent person’.69 Lawrence Blyth, a Lieutenant in 1918, was 
asked in 1988 if there were many people who couldn’t cope with trench warfare and replied: 
‘Confined in a narrow place, subjected to all this bombardment...If your nerves are not good or if 
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you are a type that just can’t take it, you break up on the thing.’70 This view allows for a man who 
had been previously strained or wounded to be as likely to succumb to mental strain as the man 
who was naturally predisposed to nervousness. Martin Brown writes home in June 1917 that: “The 
front line is the place to see what a man is like. Men who are wild and thoughtless in training pull 
themselves together and often make the very best of mates in the firing line.”71 The argument that 
prior characteristics determine a likelihood of succumbing to war neuroses seems dependent on the 
circumstances of the trauma the individual undergoes, precluding a tendency of any particular 
character type to break down. The normalcy of war neuroses as a cause of casualties was not 
officially accepted by authorities, causing attempts to combat its spread to seem unnecessarily 
harsh.  
There is a dichotomy between the views of war neuroses reflected in the official position, which 
focused on keeping enough men in the fighting lines to win the war, and the actual realities of war 
neuroses for the men who are struggling to stay alive in conditions of extreme mental stress and fear 
of life and limb.  Both of these points of view are legitimate in a time of war and national crisis. 
Attempts to use traditional methods of discipline and instilling esprit de corps into newly 
volunteered or conscripted units failed to hold back an increase in the incidences of shell shock. 
Living in the same conditions as those who could not cope, seeing men who were solid fall to pieces 
under repeated bouts of stress, gave the soldier a conception of shell shock that was not available to 
those who had not experienced those conditions. Esprit de Corps and military discipline could only 
partially work with a literate and informed soldiery, as the concept of shell shock was in the public 
domain before many of the men enlisted and were actually exposed to the conditions that 
engendered mental breakdown. A sense of shame held by the victim in being ‘shell shocked’ was not 
reciprocated by the men left in the unit as they recognised that it was inevitable that some would 
break down mentally. Any sense of shame was left for the individual, who only knew themselves 
whether or not they had given their full measure. 
Those remaining in the lines did not exhibit signs of betrayal or disappointment towards those who 
were sent back for mental reasons. There was an expectation from high command that a unit should 
have a sense of shame some of its members were breaking but this expectation was not met by the 
troops themselves. Despite shell shock being a relatively modern phenomenon it was soon apparent 
that it was an inherent part of combat in the Great War. ‘The Chances’, written by Wilfred Owen 
who was killed in action in November 1918, encapsulates the normality of mental trauma as a 
                                                          
70
 ATL, OHInt-0006/12, World War 1 Oral History Archive, Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Morris Blyth, interview 
28
th
 September 1988 and 20
th
 October 1988.  
71
 Brown letters, 20
th
 June 1917. 
47 
 
component of the Great War, expressing shell shock – “feeling mushy” – as an equal chance of the 
outcome of combat as survival, death, physical wound or capture.72 In expressing shell shock as just 
another means of becoming a casualty in a set of possible outcomes Owen provides a clue to the 
views of the ordinary soldier that is not coterminous with that of the official histories of the Great 
War or the memoirs of commanders.  
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Chapter Four 
Between the Wars 
Introduction. 
 “It would astonish the public, just as it astonished the military authorities, 
and even the medical profession generally, to find how deeply the 
psychological factor has bitten into the disability framework, and how widely 
it has ramified through its manifestations.”1  
New Zealanders that volunteered on the outbreak of war in 1939 were products of their society and 
while their motivations for enlisting were varied and complex, they carried with them the attitudes 
of their communities. The attitudes that these men formed towards psychological casualties 
originated from a combination of the prevalent views in their communities towards mental illness 
and the products of their training and service in the armed forces. The Great War was still within 
living memory in 1939 and recollections, both private and collective, were still relatively fresh. 
Society’s perceptions of returned soldiers, and those who had not returned, changed little through 
the inter-war period. The public glorified the dead and returned soldiers were lauded, even through 
the social disruption of their poor assimilation back into their communities that was often signified 
by judicial activity. The general perception New Zealanders held of their veterans was, by the end of 
the 1930’s, a reverence for the achievements of the ‘glorious dead’ buttressed by misunderstanding 
of the realities of their experiences. The veterans did not speak clearly for themselves, leaving their 
stories to be told by the official histories or the generals and politicians. The legend of the Anzac was 
entrenched in public memory by the time of World War Two and the men who went away to that 
war were generally unaware of the realities of the experiences of the previous generation. Any 
discussion of New Zealand psychological casualties in World War Two must, therefore, be rooted in 
the effects the Great War had on the psyche of the nation as a whole.  
There are several major themes associated with ‘shell shock’ following the Great War that affected 
the attitudes of 2NZEF soldiers. Firstly, shell shock as a disease entity contributed to changes in the 
manner in which mental illness was viewed and treated in New Zealand. Publicising of poor facilities 
for treatment of returned men, developments in treatment and problems of reintegration of 
veterans back into their communities meant that shell shock was frequently in the public forum. 
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Shell shock forced a re-evaluation of public attitudes towards mental illness as realisation developed 
that it was not determinate on heredity, upbringing or class. Freudian theory grew in popularity 
within the medical fraternity, and with the public, as it became less suspect for its sexual-conflict 
basis and non-British origins. Successes in treating afflicted soldiers proved the effectiveness of 
psychoanalytic treatment of shell shock and raised its status as a branch of medicine.  
The second theme is the interest of families and friends of soldiers in their experiences during the 
Great War in order to understand changes in the men themselves. There was little in the art or 
literature that emerged immediately following the armistice that showed the actual life of a soldier 
other than official histories or reminiscences of generals and politicians. Newspaper reports extolling 
the heroism of their men were not sufficient explanation for the mental or physical condition in 
which many soldiers returned home. The men themselves seldom spoke of their time away other 
than to those who had served with them. Not until the end of the 1920’s did any significant 
literature emerge that opened this closed world. By then, however, these works were a challenge to 
the public image of the ‘Anzac hero’ that had been established in the meantime.   
Thirdly, because less than a generation had passed between the two World Wars, there was a 
‘personal connectivity’ between the men of NZEF and 2NZEF, affecting the manner in which 
psychological casualties were viewed in 2NZEF. Men who led 2NZEF had either served in the Great 
War or were descendants of men who had. The leadership of 2NZEF and the New Zealand Defence 
Staff leadership had been junior officers during the Great War and had experience of the 
psychological stresses soldiers encountered in combat. Additionally, those men who were 
descendants or relatives of Great War veterans had seen the physical and mental effects of service. 
The combination of these three factors; social change resulting from public conceptualisation of 
shell shock, the influence of literature and art emanating from the Great War and personal contact 
with Great War veterans, must be assessed for their effect on determining the attitudes towards 
psychological casualties in 2NZEF.  
The Southborough report was significant because it was the first authoritative official paper made 
available to the public describing shell shock, how it affected soldiers, how the authorities treated it 
and how it could be avoided. The formation of the inquiry and its conclusions were reported 
extensively in New Zealand newspapers, with editorial views and depth. The Evening Post printed an 
extensive summary of the report’s main points.2 The report specifically noted that contraction of 
shell shock was not related to class or upbringing, which eroded the argument that predisposition 
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was based on heredity or environment.3 When officers began breaking down in proportionally 
greater numbers than their men, who were ostensibly from the lower classes, there was greater 
realisation that causes of neurosis was not dependent on class or social standing. 4 
Recommendations for prevention included improving training to maintain morale, psychological 
screening of recruits and the provision of specialist training for military doctors in the study of 
psychological disorders. The report also noted routine rest was necessary for minimisation of 
psychological injuries, and that men who were showing signs of nervous breakdown or exhaustion 
were to be rested and convalescent units established.5  
Taking a more socialist viewpoint the NZ Truth reported the enquiry briefly but emphasised the 
point that the report noted that execution of shell shocked men for cowardice was justified, even if 
it was beyond the individual’s control.6 Alternatively, the Northern Advocate reported aspects of the 
report that confirmed the theories of predisposition to nervous disorder in victims; “An enormous 
proportion of those who broke down, said Dr. F. B. Fanning, had been neurotics previously and 
resented military service…” and “… that the stress of fear rarely produced insanity in the stable man, 
but that it acted as a factor upon those with a predisposition.”7 These newspapers edited the report 
to highlight specific issues that supported their own political or editorial viewpoints. 
 
Shell Shocked Men Returned to New Zealand 
 “The stigma is not one that should be applied to returned soldiers...”8 
Prior to the Great War mental illness was believed to be predominantly a hereditary trait, causing 
families to carry the stigma of a mentally ill family member within the community. Peter Boston 
addresses this in his thesis A Bacillus of Work, which argues that views of hereditary predisposition 
suited both the army, which held that predisposition limited the liability of war service for 
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psychological injury, and the public, who did not have to consider that the ‘epitome of New Zealand 
manhood’ could succumb to mental stresses.9 Mental health authorities in New Zealand believed 
that hereditary factors were the major cause of neuroses. The 1919 report of the Inspector General 
of Mental Hospitals, Frank Hay, states,  
 “Past experience has demonstrated that a man of sound mind, fighting honestly for a cause, 
 will face dangers and undergo great privations without losing his mental balance. He may 
 pass through terrible anxieties, but they are seldom for himself, and he is maintained by a 
 normally reacting mental and moral exaltation, which sweeps away petty vanities and 
 vexations, widens his horizon to include his comrades, and directs his thoughts and energies 
 for the general good. It is different with those predisposed to mental disorder. Even with the 
 best of intentions on their part, one expected, especially where this predisposition was 
 marked, that the adjustment to  unexpected changes of environment, possibly short of 
 service at the front, would prove a disturbing factor. With instability of lesser degree many 
 may come through all right, but they are playing with gunpowder.”10 
Psychiatric medicine, not psychology, dominated mental health treatment in New Zealand. Boston 
makes the point that hereditary predisposition towards neurosis as a concept was bolstered by the 
fact that the psychiatric doctors were usually from the wealthier classes within New Zealand, while 
patients were not – “the working class were more easily afflicted”.11 Gwen Parsons’ paper ‘The 
Construction of Shell Shock in New Zealand, 1919-1939: A Reassessment’ shows that the 
psychiatrists in New Zealand’s mental institutions resisted psychoanalytic therapies as a threat to 
their methods and systems.12 The return to New Zealand of doctors trained in psychotherapy 
enabled the treatment of afflicted veterans in newly established specialist shell shock centres in 
Auckland, Seacliff and Hanmer in the methods that had evolved during the war. The compromise of 
separation of civilian and military patients enabled psychotherapeutic treatment to be administered 
to military patients without compromising treatment offered to civilian patients in the same 
facilities.  
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Separation of military and civilian patients in mental facilities was maintained not only to separate 
the method of treatment but to appease the sensibilities of patients’ families. Stigma attached to 
having a mental patient in the family was felt strongly due to connotations of hereditary cause. The 
RSA and regional Patriotic Societies lobbied persistently to have returned soldiers separated from 
the general population of mental facilities. By 1917, facilities were established in both islands to 
exclusively to treat veterans.13 Exceptions to isolated treatment were “only with a few civilian 
patients in a like mental condition and companionable” in Karitane House at Seacliff Mental 
Hospital.14 Use of psychoanalytic therapies for civilians suffering neuroses indicates recognition of 
the benefit of this methodology and the similarity of the illness in military and civilian contexts. The 
return of psychological casualties to New Zealand drew attention to the condition of mental facilities 
and the status of wounded soldiers in the community. Admission of shell shocked soldiers into 
general wards of mental institutions was abhorrent to their families and the nascent RSA.15 
However, the admission of shell shocked men into the mental health facilities exposed the staff to 
psychotherapy and a means of gauging its effectiveness.16 This had later ramifications in advancing 
psychotherapeutic methods in a civilian context, especially following admission of civilian patients to 
military wards at Seacliff.  
The stigma associated with mental illness was broken somewhat by the view that volunteer soldiers, 
seen as the epitome of the nation’s manhood, should be sheltered from association with the 
institutionalised mentally ill. Placement in separate facilities made clear the differentiation between 
those who had become ‘national icons’ through heroic military service and the stigmatised mental 
patient.17 Specialist facilities for treatment of shell shocked men had been established in main 
centres during the war but Queen Mary Hospital in Hanmer was established as the single treatment 
centre by the end of 1921.18 Queen Mary was used to treat only those likely to recover and so had a 
relatively high turnover of patients as those not responding to treatment were committed to mental 
hospitals under the Mental Health Act.19 Treatment at Queen Mary was based on psychotherapeutic 
methods pioneered in the Great War. Staff were trained at Maudsley Hospital and other facilities in 
Britain using psychoanalytic methods for treatment of neurosis as opposed to traditional psychiatric 
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methodology used in mental facilities in New Zealand.20  The Southborough report raised the profile 
of Freudian theories of psychoanalysis in public, ironically by rejecting it as a basis for treatment of 
neurosis, but at the same time promoting treatments that were to all intents and purposes Freudian 
in method.21 The high success rate in Queen Mary strengthened acceptance of psychotherapy as a 
treatment method for neuroses. By the end of 1922, military patient numbers had reduced to a level 
where administration of Queen Mary Hospital was transferred from the Department of Defence to 
the Department of Health and civilian patients were being accepted. 
Newspapers 
“"Oh, shell-shock has died by this time, surely?" quoth his Honor.”22 
Newspaper articles in New Zealand relating to shell shock mostly consisted of two main types; 
features relating to the medical aspects of shell shock which touched on treatment methods or 
scientific progress, and articles that reported re-assimilation issues of shell shocked veterans though 
the courts, suicides or human interest stories. Both types of article were overwhelmingly 
sympathetic and their overall effect was to normalise shell shock as a consequence of war. 
Newspapers provide a useful insight into how New Zealand society viewed the veteran and those 
suffering mental illness resulting from their war service. All major urban centres had at least one 
daily newspaper and rural and provincial centres had papers covering local interest and often copied 
or edited articles from the major dailies. The New Zealand Yearbook of 1920 records 240 
newspapers or magazines being printed in New Zealand in 1919, comprising 62 daily editions and 
the balance being printed from thrice-weekly to monthly.23 Newspapers comprised the most 
important means of dissemination of public information until radio transmission became generally 
available to the public from 1926.24 Issues arising from using newspaper articles as a source are the 
possibility that bias, if any, of the newspaper’s owners and editors are generally undeterminable 
unless there is a specific pattern in the reports emanating from a particular journal. Most of the 
provincial newspapers utilised as sources in this paper repeated stories, occasionally edited, from 
the major city dailies.  
Several of the specific interest newspapers had national distribution. The Maoriland Worker was 
produced by the socialist wing of the Labour Party, taking a radical view of politics and social issues 
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until its demise in 1924.25 NZ Truth, published in Wellington, focused on politics in a tabloid format 
that targeted corruption and “reported the unseemly aspects of life in immoderate prose.”26 
Although there were different areas of focus in the various newspapers published in New Zealand, 
there is little difference in their general stance to the rehabilitation and treatment of returned 
soldiers. The tone of newspaper articles was overwhelmingly sympathetic towards psychological 
casualties. Frequent references in the court pages of barristers utilising shell shock as a mitigating 
factor helped normalise, through repetition, shell shock as a consequence of war service.  
The theme of sympathy belies modern memory that portrays veterans struggling to secure welfare 
rights. Gwen Parsons illustrates the difference between this perception and reality in ‘The 
Construction of Shell Shock in New Zealand’, arguing that difficulties shell shocked men had in 
recovering and readjusting were more the result of an administration overwhelmed by the scale of 
the problem than lack of intent.27 This view is supported by the lack of condemnation from within 
the community towards mental illness suffered by veterans. As evidenced in the attitudes of soldiers 
towards shell shocked comrades, any shame and guilt attached to the mental illness aspect of shell 
shock was held more by the victim than others and this is repeated in the community.  
Newspaper reports of New Zealand veterans who had committed suicide appeared regularly from 
1919, as did sensational suicides from overseas.28 The Observer, in December 1920, noted the RSA 
Dominion Executive had highlighted the rate of suicides amongst veterans and “that the proportion 
of suicides and sudden deaths among returned men has been above the civilian rate. It is a very sad 
thing but inevitable.”29 Newspapers reporting that suicides were veterans, irrespective of its 
relevance to the story, gave prominence in the public mind that veterans were more susceptible 
than the general population. The Observer article reporting the RSA Dominion Executive continued, 
“The public does not realise how many returned men there are who, without much outward sign, 
are suffering daily on account of their war service.”30 This sentiment was also reflected in the 
Maoriland Worker of 28 April 1920, which called for creation of the system voluntary committal to 
mental institutions of the veteran “...with unfortunate results to his bodily and mental condition...” 
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from war service.31 This Maoriland Worker article also notes the need for specialised care to 
ameliorate the high rate of suicides amongst returned servicemen. However, there was doubt 
whether there was a higher rate of suicide among veterans than in the general population. In his 
autobiography, Major-General Fred Bowerbank, DGMS of the NZMC, records that he was requested 
in 1919 to compare the suicide rates of veterans against rates within the general population and 
found there was no statistical difference.32 Despite doubts as to the accuracy of high suicide rates of 
veterans, it was highlighted it as an issue in the public mind and the call in the Maoriland Worker 
and other publications for a system of voluntarily admittance on a temporary basis predates its 
actual introduction by several years.  
Shell shock as a legacy of war was regular subject matter for newspapers, and was covered with 
sympathy because the public realised the mental consequences of war hindered veteran’s re-
assimilation back into their communities. Pugsley relates the difficulties veterans had in reclaiming 
their old place in society, notably with employment difficulties and broken marriages.33 Often 
disillusioned that they could not reclaim their lives from the point of their enlistment, they were now 
trained in military skills that were mostly irrelevant to civilian employment, a conclusion the Ex-
Soldiers Rehabilitation Commission Report of 1930 reached. 34 These conclusions are very similar to 
the Pensions Department Annual Report of 1924.35 The Ashburton Guardian and the Auckland Star 
carry an article from the British Daily Mail from December 1919 relating to the number of crimes 
attributed to shell shocked veterans, indicating the perception is exaggerated.  
“Many of the men now mentally upset and perhaps committing offences against the law, 
went into the war without believing in its necessity. In them there was a continuous 
psychological contest going on and they became victim of ‘shell-shock’. But if such a man … 
had a powerful reason for fighting and probably would have escaped ‘shell shock’….my 
conclusion is that the only remedy is to let the law take its course. Too much sympathy is 
destructive of moral fibre: only fear will keep the after-war neurotic on a straight course." 36 
                                                          
31
 ‘Shell Shock Cases’, Maoriland Worker, 28 April, 1920, p. 4. This article refers to an ex-soldier who had been 
seen behaving erratically and was later found dead in Auckland harbour. The man was reported to the police 
but was unable to be held or committed as he was insufficiently ill to be detained under existing legislation. 
32
 Major-General Sir Fred Thomson Bowerbank, A Doctor’s Story (Wingfield Press, 1958), p. 160. 
33
 Pugsley, Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story, p. 355. 
34
 AJHR, Report of the Ex-Soldiers Rehabilitation Commission, 1930, H-39, p. 4. 
35
 AJHR, ‘Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the Pensions Department for the Year Ended 31
st 
March 1924’, H-18, 
p. 9. 
36
 ‘”Shell Shock” Crimes’, Auckland Star, 28 February, 1920, p. 19 
56 
 
The Ashburton Guardian edited the article and added “The common theory regarding the influence 
of shell shock on crime was largely exaggerated.”37 The inference in this article is that predisposition 
is a factor in contracting shell shock was commonly held and a hard line should be taken with 
‘neurotics’ who could not maintain requisite moral fibre. That the British legal system is also dealing 
with many maladjusted veterans indicates rehabilitation is relevant to more than just New Zealand. 
A major aspect of the term shell shock is that although the term itself had been discontinued in an 
official context from 1916, there were articles using the term well into World War Two. That shell 
shock is referenced for that long in an ‘unofficial’ manner reinforces the indication that it had taken 
on a public meaning of its own. In January 1939, the Auckland Star published a report of Japanese 
casualties in China that postulated “…but there are no figures to show the enormous number, 
perhaps almost equal, who suffered from shell shock…”38 The Evening Post of 25th February 1939, 
published a report from a meeting of the Left Book Club with a speaker describing the suffering 
“...from horrible wounds and shell shock...”of civilian refugees fleeing the Spanish Civil War.39 From 
one of his voluminous letters to his mother in August 1943, Gunner Lawrie Birks states “...as they’re 
all wounded or shell-shocked or ill ...”40 The use of ‘shell shock’ as late as August 1942 frin within 
men of 2NZEF shows either Birks’ desire to be empathetic with his mother’s terminology or that the 
term was natural to him. It indicates the manner in which the term was imbedded into New Zealand 
society, with the people having their own understanding of the term in relation to their society. 
Shell shock had taken on a meaning quite different from that at its creation. In moving from an 
attempt to define a phenomenon nebulous and overwhelming in its manifestation, ‘shell shock’ 
acquired a meaning for the public that defined the quite different and disparate emotions and states 
of mind of all veterans with psychological or emotional problems. In 1920 an article reporting the 
status of the Bank of New Zealand in the economic recovery following the war, the Hawera and 
Normanby Star wrote “One message rings out clearly throughout – that as a nation it is our duty to 
work hard for the restoration of the world, which is suffering so terribly from what Mr Lloyd George 
termed “shell shock”.”41 Later, in September 1920, the same newspaper quoted Mr W.H. Trigg, of 
the New Zealand Legislative Council, as saying “that the world was still suffering from shell shock...42 
These articles use the term to define a form of mass social emotional condition, rather than relating 
to an individual’s illness. In a lighter vein the Observer in 1920 published in a humour column that 
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“The Chief Justice (Sir Robert Stout) will be grieved to hear that an alcoholic stimulant perpetuating 
his name is called “shell shock.” It consists of Stout and port wine.”43 Following the Napier 
earthquake of 1931, the Auckland Star ran an article reporting the need for evacuees to return to aid 
in reconstruction. “Even some of the younger men were suffering from what could be termed “shell 
shock.”44 The public had begun the process of redefining ‘shell shock’ in terms of what it meant to 
them and their society. This continued of the process of ‘demilitarisation’ of the term ‘shell shock’ 
where the term itself began to develop a meaning in the public mind separate to the now obsolete 
military definition. 
That a man was shell shocked following war service was portrayed in New Zealand media as a 
normal consequence of that service. Even where it was irrelevant to the article, it was commonly 
reported if the veteran had suffered shell shock. Reports of celebrities suffering shell shock, such as 
Charlie Chaplin’s mother succumbing following air raids in England, depict shell shock as an 
emotional state to be expected following trauma.45 With the winding up of the Patriotic Societies 
following the war, extensive discussion ensued regarding the means of disbursing accumulated 
funds. Need of long term care of psychological casualties was recognised publicly and a welfare 
scheme was developed to provide long term assistance to veterans and their dependants.46 The RSA 
also saw the need for long term funding for men who broke down again after release from hospitals 
or for those who broke down during rehabilitation after discharge from the services. Addressing the 
Wellington RSA, General Birdwood indicated the need for long term funding for relief work for 
soldiers who “might work well for a month or so, then break down temporarily.”47  
Official recognition of latent financial and social cost following repatriation is published in 1924 in 
the annual Pensions Department report which highlighted the stress of reassimilation, employment 
and financial issues subsequent to discharge were causing relapses of psychological problems 
encountered by men during the war.48 Both social and official acceptance of recurrence or delayed 
onset of psychological illness in veterans is a strong indication of sympathy which men were 
afforded in the community.  
It was seen as normal for a veteran to suffer psychological injury, even if he had not actually been 
diagnosed. Shell shocked soldiers became a butt of humour in society and unusual social behaviour 
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was explained away as the result of war service.49 A letter to the editor of the Evening Post of 23 
November 1933, bemoans the effect Territorial artillery exercises in the Basin reserve and Mt. 
Victoria had on the local pets, who were “suffering from “shell shock”...”50 Similarly, in October 
1936, an article in the Auckland Star reported the pursuit by a policeman of individuals who threw 
“lighted fireworks at the feet of pedestrians. Men suffering shell shock have been severely affected 
by shock arising from such thoughtless acts.”51 The shell shocked man had become a person who 
belonged to the previous generation by the end of the 1930’s and was treated with sympathy by the 
community at large but generally not seen by the new generation in the same manner.  
Medical features in newspapers throughout the inter-war years exhibit a wide range of information 
relating to the treatment and care of shell shock victims. From advertisements for patent medicine 
to sooth nerves to articles extolling bee venom as a cure for shell shock, there were many alternative 
curatives available for the public.52 More academic features included discussion of benefits of 
psychoanalysis and hypnotism, which were becoming more acceptable into the 1930’s as a 
treatment for neuroses.53 The gradual increase in influence of psychoanalysis in the treatment of 
neuroses is not reported specifically. Numbers of articles increased that referred to psychoanalytic 
methods but even these were irregular and the shift from psychiatry to psychoanalysis as the 
predominant treatment for neuroses is not obvious to those not involved in the practice of 
medicine.  
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Arts and Literature. 
“The drama "Journey's End," which has had such a successful run in England 
and the Continent, and is now in our own midst, must leave a peculiar taste 
in the mouth of every soldier.”54 
Almost universally the memories of combat veterans were only reluctantly recalled to people who 
had not served themselves. Their relatives wanted to understand what their men had gone through. 
This need was not met by censored newspaper reports which tended to focus on patriotic heroism 
or censored letters which highlighted the humorous, mundane or trivial. Publications from the 
politicians and generals emerged quickly following the war but were not relevant to the majority of 
soldiers.55 Profusions of war themed literature began to emerge toward the end of the 1920’s, 
written by the ordinary soldier who recalled the experience of soldiering and life in the lines. Eric 
Leeds argues this outpouring of literature is the result of people being reduced in the Great 
Depression’s industrial landscape to the ‘microcosmic proportions’ of the soldier during the Great 
War, enabling the public to understand the condition of soldiering during modern warfare.56 The 
sense of shame held by the psychological casualty often restrained their desire to publicise their 
condition.57 Hence, the psychological casualty rarely wrote about it and other writers focused on 
generalities to avoid offending individuals they had served with. The depiction of shell shock in art, 
film and literature was as a plot device which was merely depicted to fit mental disintegration into 
the story to arouse empathy towards a character. The reality of shell shock was generally not visible 
in fiction and was rarely seen in non-fiction for fear of besmirching the memories or myths that 
emerged of the ‘glorious dead’ or the ‘Anzac hero’. The outcome of exhibiting shell shock in this 
manner was that it had an undue influence on the perception of those readers or viewers who did 
not understand the reality of the disease entity itself.58 Examples of films that screened in New 
Zealand showed shell shock affecting a single veteran still afflicted after the war, not shell shocked 
during the war.59 There were three versions of the comedy film Three Live Ghosts made between 
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1922 and 1936, all adapted from a stage script of the same name originally copyrighted in 1918.60 
The popular comedy has a shell shocked character and while openly identified as such, the portrayal 
could be any form of illness that allows the character to be both amnesiac and kleptomaniac. The 
character as a shell shock victim, however, is portrayed as if it was a normal condition for some 
veterans following the war and the plot has the character instantly cured by a blow to the head. The 
1929 and 1932 versions were advertised extensively throughout New Zealand and the 1936 version 
ran in cinemas from September 1938 until September 1940, notably long for the high turnover of 
movies exhibited in New Zealand at the time. The exposure of this portrayal to large audience 
numbers of shell shock as a comic foil is likely to have diminished the seriousness of the condition to 
the audience.  
Non-fictional literature that portrayed shell shock in New Zealanders was not common, even with 
the release of large numbers of war reminiscences and war themed novels from the late 1920’s. 
Importations of literature grew through the 1920’s until the Great Depression affected the economic 
strength of New Zealanders.61 Aside from many Official Unit Histories, there were a number of non-
fiction works published in the early 1920’s, mostly by generals and politicians explaining their 
actions. These works were advertised for sale in New Zealand, including some that explored the 
medical aspects of the war.62 The entity of shell shock featured in a number of publications that 
purported to provide cures from mental illness through ‘alternative’ medicine.63  
Two seminal works of fiction appeared towards the end of the 1920’s, Erich Maria Remarque’s book 
All Quiet on the Western Front64 and Robert Cedric Sherriff’s play Journey’s End, in the beginning of 
what was termed the ‘War Book Craze’. These were the first of many literary works that portrayed 
the war without the romance that had accompanied previous war stories, encompassing fiction and 
non-fiction, that began to show life in the frontlines and motivations of combatants very differently 
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to the image created by the ‘Anzac heroes’ myth.65 All Quiet on the Western Front, in book and film 
formats, had a large public profile, as much for the content as for the publicity surrounding the 
battle distributors had with censorship authorities in both New Zealand and Australia.66 Although the 
book was released by the New Zealand censor, the motion picture was initially banned and only 
after significant public pressure released for screening with cuts.67 Ironically the book All Quiet on 
the Western Front was banned in Australia but the film was released, a reversal of the New Zealand 
situation.68 Neither the book nor film of All Quiet on the Western Front shows shell shock as a central 
component. The significance of All Quiet on the Western Front lies with the central character’s 
motivation being mere survival, not higher motives such as patriotism or glory.  
Journey’s End, as a stage play, and a film in 1930, was reported in entertainment columns of 
newspapers before it was staged in New Zealand and was much anticipated following its success 
overseas.69 The Auckland Star published the play as a serial in 1930 and the script was advertised on 
the bestseller lists for sale as a book.70 Staged in New Zealand for the first time in Auckland in 
October 1929, the play attracted “a large and fashionable audience” before continuing to run 
through other major centres.71 The film version did not have the success of the stage play, nor was it 
as successful as the film of All Quiet on the Western Front. The stage version, however, was 
immensely successful, with extended runs around the world.72 The popularity of Journey’s End and 
All Quiet on the Western Front was that they garnered supportive audiences from two diverse 
factions; those that wished to know the ‘realities’ of trench warfare and those supporting the cause 
of world peace. But opposition also gathered from those who objected that the works denigrated 
the myths of New Zealanders in the Great War 
Both Journey’s End and All Quiet on the Western Front were available as literature and visual arts 
simultaneously and so had extensive exposure. Consequently newspapers carried a huge variety of 
letters and features regarding the accuracy, merit and meaning of the two works. Despite the 
success of ‘realistic’ war stories available at that time, there was sufficient diverse opinion for the 
themes of the works to be lost in the debates. Although publication of All Quiet on the Western 
Front preceded the release of Journey’s End, there was less public contention directly relating to the 
lack of ‘nobility’ in the characters in All Quiet on the Western Front, possibly because of the German 
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perspective. Veterans and their relatives wrote to newspapers decrying that Journey’s End 
“illuminated by a cruel light, picking out the bad patches, focusing on the rare, the grotesque and 
unusual, and featuring them as "fair average quality”...”73 This writer to the Evening Post signed 
himself ‘A.I.F.’, acronym for Australian Imperial Force, Australia’s equivalent to ‘NZEF’. ‘N.Z.E.F.’ 
wrote the next day in support and noted “It seems to me important that those who did not enjoy 
the privilege of fighting for their country should be told that the neurotic types were in a very 
definite minority.74 Responding to ‘A.I.F.’ through the letters page, M. Jones stated: 
 “We are living now in a period when old traditions are being scrapped holus bolus; a new era 
 has dawned; and those living to-day may see the dawn of a wonderful civilisation...And yet 
 to-day after all the tragedy and suffering we see people making every effort to dress up and 
 glorify warfare...”75 
Many veterans and families of the fallen saw the stripping away of nobility in the actions of New 
Zealand soldiers by “dragging down the heroism of our men – into the dirt” as “utterly false and 
vile.”76 The backlash from those determined to maintain the reputation of the veteran diminished 
the popularity of the war book, aided by declining quality of writing itself as the craze continued, as 
quantity replaced the quality of writing of the earlier seminal works. "We are submerged by a flood 
of so called war books which depict the men ... as brutes and beasts, living like pigs and dying like 
dogs.” The article continues, “ ...these books were conceived in dirt and published for the profit that 
dirt will bring."77 The argument was put forward by Jessie Mackay, New Zealand Poet, feminist and 
freelance journalist, in 1930 that; 
  “...it is a bankrupt kind of morality that refuses to face, even the worst of these harsh 
 remembrances, written by those who were where we were not. The psychology of war is 
 reflected freely as far back as in the plays of Euripides. Shakespeare was not sparing of 
 allusions to it, and if our few rags of war glorification have survived the mordancy of 
 Siegfried Sassoon and the balanced admissions of men like T. E. Lawrence and Sir Ian 
 Hamilton himself, we have been slow indeed in the uptake..78 
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By 1933, the war book craze had receded into the past as something almost disrespectful and by 
1935 westerns and crime fulfilled the public need for sensationalist writing.79 Events in Europe 
through the mid to late 1930’s reduced the effectiveness of the pacifist movement.  
The proliferation of war books had subsided within a few years but had created a large amount of 
interest at the time, especially in conjunction with motion pictures produced to take advantage of a 
receptive market. As indicated by Jessie Mackay, there were references to the psychological burden 
of soldiering in existing literature. From a New Zealand perspective Ormond Burton’s The Silent 
Division80, published in 1935, was the first of the non-fiction works to state, even if rather obliquely, 
the mental stresses of warfare applied to the troops of the NZEF, but did not threaten the ‘Anzac 
legend’ that had been built up through the 1920’s and defended through the war book craze. 
Reference to shell shock and mental trauma on the part of New Zealand soldiers was muted 
throughout The Silent Division. The word shell-shock is written once in the entire work.81 There are a 
few references to the mental strain the men are under and references to men ‘going mad’ or 
suffering nerves. Overall The Silent Division attempts to uphold the reputation of the ‘Anzac hero’ 
rather than substantially explain any more than was written in the unit histories of the early 1920’s. 
The boys who would grow to fight in World War Two had their own literature in the form of Boy’s 
Magazines, which held adventure stories, puzzles and games targeted at the boys of early to mid-
teen age. Mostly imported from Britain, titles like Champion, Startler, Boy’s Own, Triumph, Magnet 
and Ranger were readily available and sold cheaply.82 The Boy’s Magazine’s message was one of 
comradeship, sacrifice and heroism.83 Adventure, sporting or war stories extolled the virtues of 
comradeship, sacrifice and courage in the face of heavy odds. Writers such as W. E. Johns (of 
‘Biggles’ fame), entertainer Arthur Askey, and author J. M. Walsh contributed stories of ‘derring-do’, 
glory and heroism.84 Adventure stories with titles such as ‘War Wings’85, ‘Cowards Courage!’86 or 
‘Whizz-Bang Bob; Terror of the Touchline’87 promulgated the virtues assumed to appeal to the youth 
of the day.88 Their popularity in New Zealand is attested by the volume imported during the inter-
war period, a million copies annually by 1936, by then including numbers of American crime and 
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romance magazines.89 The number of titles imported and how well they were known is indicated by 
a competition run in the Evening Post children’s puzzle section in 1934 requiring children to un-
jumble the names of boys’ magazines.90 The effect of the magazines on young people is hinted at by 
Harry Delamere Barker Dansey, the son of Great War veteran Harry Delamere Dansey, who writes to 
his mother before embarking for overseas service, “And if I should not come back it will be the finest 
way of going that a real man can hope for. … if someone can sing “Tama ngakau marie [sic]” that 
wonderful hymn for me then I will rest content.”91 This language reads as if it is straight out of a 
boy’s magazine itself. The letters of Harry Dansey snr., quoted in Chapter Three, are more reflective 
of the darker aspects of war and this leads to the conclusion that he was not communicative about 
his Great War service with his children following his return. 
The novels, art and film produced between the wars varied from authentic realism that was 
incomprehensible to non-participants to blatant anti-war propaganda, with all possible content in 
between. The backlash following the war book boom negated much of the peace message as it too 
deeply challenged the legend of the Anzac. The Silent Division restored the equilibrium of public 
memory that had existed in the early 1920’s. As the minimum age for military recruitment in New 
Zealand remained the same as in the Great War at 21 years of age, that placed the age of recruits in 
1939 as early teens in 1930. This is an age that generally would not read serious literature unless 
compelled through schooling. It is hard to imagine a teacher who was old enough to be a veteran 
presenting All Quiet on the Western Front as required classroom reading. 
The effect of literature and arts through the inter-war period on enlistees at the beginning of World 
War Two is uncertain. Bowerbank writes in his autobiography of New Zealand recruits for the RAF 
being fit but needing better education, being remedied by the inclusion of classical literature in the 
ships library carrying the recruits to England.92 Although this refers to the Greek classics, the 
inference is that these men were intelligent enough for the RAF but they were narrow in their 
breadth of reading. Wellington’s Chief Librarian notes an increase in the issue of books relating to 
the Great War and Europe as tensions in the northern hemisphere increased, after a lull in the 
middle of the decade as the public became less interested in books relating to war.93 Motives 
encouraging individuals to enlist in World War Two were complex and few that have recorded their 
motives give simple answers. Angus Ross, later commanding 23Bn, writes he enlisted “because I had 
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become utterly convinced that “Appeasement” and similar policies had ... failed completely.94  
Captain John Williams, of 24Bn, indicates that “I had of course read about the resurgence of 
Germany’s military might and Nazism and could see the threats that posed.”95 Both of these men 
infer they were well read enough to form an opinion of the events in Europe and decide to enlist. 
William Allan Pyatt, of 19Bn, was a theology student and training towards ordination on enlistment, 
notes some foreknowledge of conditions under which he would be expected to serve,  
“We did not go singing Tipperary, to kill Germans. It was much more simply putting their 
bodies in front of terror & violence. It was NOT [emphasis in original] a matter of heroics (I 
was 2/Lieut of infantry, & our only experience of an infantry officers [sic] life expectancy was 
from World War 1 - about two weeks.”96 
 Acknowledging that these notes were written following the war, there is an indication within them 
that Lieutenant Pyatt was aware of the conditions confronted by junior officers in the Great War and 
had anticipated that these would be repeated. Casualty rates were disproportionately high for junior 
infantry leaders during the Great War, and were to prove so again.97  
The effect of literature and art on recruits in World War Two is difficult to gauge in relation to their 
understanding of shell shock. Public memory of the Great War became a combination of the 
memorials, recollections of veterans and the images created by the art, film and literature between 
the wars. These images led many of the soldiers in World War Two to believe that the conditions 
under which they were serving were less onerous than those of the men a generation earlier in the 
Great War. Lawrie Birks writes to reassure his mother following the Greek campaign that,  
“… the casualties must have been insignificant compared with the slaughter of Gallipoli or 
Passchendaele, for instance. I suppose the papers made a lot of it, but there really wasn’t 
much to it.” …  “However, since you want to know about it, here it is. But don’t expect any 
‘All Quiet’ touches.”98 
Comparing the Greek campaign to battles of the Great War placed it in a context in which his mother 
can relate, and affirming the idea that the conditions in the war he fought would not be as horrific. 
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Birks is confirming the influence of the public memory and war book writing on his view of the war 
he is involved in.99 The comparison between the two wars showed that soldiers of 2NZEF did not 
believe that they would suffer as much from the conditions in which they fought as those of NZEF. 
Such a belief arose from the vision they had of the conditions in the Great War.  
 
Leadership 
“I consider him much superior in experience and command …”100 
The leadership of 2NZEF had experienced the Great War first hand. While there is no evidence 
suggesting any of the leadership group of 2NZEF had suffered significant psychological problems 
from the Great War, they had almost all been in positions where they had likely witnessed men 
succumbing to shell shock. General Freyberg had been a battalion commander during the Great War, 
a position noted as the highest military command where it is possible to know all the men in a 
unit.101 Freyberg was quoted in the Evening Post in February 1930, in response to the release of All 
Quiet on the Western Front and Journey’s End as saying that he “did not believe a solitary man was 
shot for cowardice.”102 There is a fine point of contention in this statement as most men executed 
during the war were tried for desertion rather than cowardice. As many of those executed were 
veteran soldiers and in some cases decorated for valour, compelling evidence exists that they were 
executed as examples during periods of heavy casualties.103 This is ironic as one of the only three 
British officers shot for desertion in the Great War, Sub-Lieutenant Edwin Dyett, was convicted for 
failing to reinforce Freyberg’s battalion in the same action Freyberg was bestowed the Victoria Cross 
in 1916.104 In any case Freyberg expressed a determination that his leadership, in relation to morale 
and casualties, would not repeat those of the last war. Freyberg is quoted in Richard Holmes’ ‘Five 
Armies in Italy 1943-45’ as stating, just prior to Cassino, “Reminds you of Passchendaele, doesn’t it? 
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But we’ll have no more Passchendaeles.”105 McLeod in Myth and Reality provides a critique of 
Freyberg’s generalship, balancing his strengths and weaknesses but positively acknowledging his 
ability in maintaining unit morale and unity. 
The lessons imparted from the Southborough Report regarding the importance of food and rest 
were applied under Freyberg’s leadership of 2NZEF. Freyberg insisted on rations similar to New 
Zealand staples, regular mail and rest facilities exclusively for New Zealanders.106 Food was a 
preoccupation in letters of servicemen for several reasons. Censorship restricted subject matter in 
letters and being well fed reassured families. Meals for soldiers were communal and a common 
subject at hand was the food, so it was ingrained into the soldier in the field as a highlight of the day. 
The references in New Zealanders letters were often about the type of food as well as the quantity. 
By improving the quality of the food available to New Zealand soldiers Freyberg made a positive 
contribution to morale. Both the leadership of the division and the troops made references to the 
type of food available in their letters. Brigadier William Gentry, on Freyberg’s staff and later CO of 9th 
Brigade, makes several references to the availability, and sometimes the lack, of specific food types 
that were staples in New Zealand but unobtainable on service, as does Private Lawrie Birks. 
“…normally everyone is well fed except for fish and there is nothing on these lines to be got around 
here.”107 “By the way, if they’re just as easy to get, you might send wholemeal or wholesome if 
you’re sending any more biscuits, as I seem to remember they’re more wholemealy [sic] than the 
Wheaten Wafers...”108 The provision of rest facilities exclusively for New Zealanders and provision of 
food tempered to the New Zealand palate were innovations from Freyberg that had a material 
impact on morale. Freyberg’s support for the New Zealand Forces Club bolstered the morale of the 
men as they had places from which to base their tours of the cities of Italy when leave became 
available.109  
Commanding medical arrangements on the New Zealand Defence Force Staff was Frederick 
Bowerbank, a Brigadier General at the commencement of World War Two, and Major-General in 
1944. Bowerbank had served as a doctor in No. 1 NZ General Hospital in Egypt during the Gallipoli 
campaign, then Brockenhurst hospital in England when the NZEF transferred to France, before being 
stationed at Etaples from January 1918.110 Brockenhurst included shell shock annexes, under the 
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care of Major R. H. Hogg of Invercargill, who became a friend of Bowerbank.111 Following the 
armistice Bowerbank spent time on medical grading boards and several months with the British 
Pension Board as medical advisor, experience which was useful in the 1924 inquiry into the New 
Zealand war pensions system, and membership of the War Pension Appeals Board.112 Bowerbank 
had first-hand experience of shell shock cases through the Great War as a medical doctor, so was not 
specifically treating psychological casualties. However, his autobiography contains observations that 
“in Egypt how frequently men suffering from even severe gunshot wounds were so much brighter 
and more cheerful than those suffering from a medical disease”.113 Two points of interest are 
contained in this statement. Firstly, that injuries caused by enemy activity do not cause guilt in 
wounded men, inferring that psychological injury does. Secondly, that using the term ‘medical 
disease’ in relation to shell shock indicates that he considered shell shock to be a medical condition 
beyond the control of the individual. These conclusions, which Bowerbank developed through the 
Great War and after, had ramifications in the manner in which the NZMC and 2 NZEF administered 
anxiety neurosis through World War Two.  
Of the leadership group of 2NZEF nearly all had experienced combat conditions in the Great War. 
The DMS of 2NZEF, Brigadier Kenneth MacCormick, was a Great War veteran who had served as the 
RMO of 4Bn, NZ Rifle Brigade from April 1916 to August 1917 then as CO of 2 NZ Field Ambulance. 
MacCormick served through the NZEF involvement in the Somme campaign at Flers and then 
through Messines, earning a DSO for bringing in wounded under fire at Bellvue Spur in October 
1917. As RMO, MacCormick was responsible for the initial treatment of psychological casualties and 
transfer of those unresponsive to treatment.114 The period of 1916 to 1917 was where British and 
Commonwealth medical corps began to shift from the view of shell shock as an individual’s 
willpower issue to one where a treatment for physical and mental exhaustion overcame most 
symptoms, in the short term at least. 
The 1st Echelon of 2NZEF arrived in Egypt in February 1940, with a Divisional Headquarters unit, 
comprising headquarters staff and four infantry battalions, Divisional Cavalry unit, an artillery 
regiment and field ambulance units. The brigade commander, Brigadier Edward Puttick, was a Great 
War veteran who commanded a battalion in the New Zealand Rifle Brigade during the 
Passchendaele battles.115 Of the commanders of the battalions in Puttick’s Brigade in 1940 only one 
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had not served in the NZEF. Kippenberger (20Bn), Inglis (27(MG)Bn), Pierce (Div Cav) and Varnham 
(19Bn), were all officers in the Great War, only Gray of the 18th Battalion had no combat 
experience.116 Similarly the commanders of the Second Echelon had combat experience from the 
Great War.117 Of these Major Les Andrew, commanding 22Bn, had a Victoria Cross from 1917 whilst 
a Corporal in the Wellington Regiment.118 Lieutenant-Colonel’s Macky, Falconer and Dittmer, 
commanding 21 Bn, 23 Bn and 28 (Maori) Bn respectively, had all been decorated in the Great War 
whist serving with New Zealand forces.119 As leaders with combat experience the senior officers of 
2NZEF had opportunities to teach their subordinates lessons from their own experience in the Great 
War. Men who returned to the colours in also shared their experiences with the younger soldiers. 
Lawrie Birks describes his friend James Grimsley, who is referred to “as ‘Old Jim’ though actually he 
can’t be more than about 45, as he went through the last war, joining at 17, so he says.”120 Birks 
goes on to say “Of course, his age, and I suppose even more his experiences 25 years ago, tell 
against him now, and he can’t stand up to the life to the extent that the rest of us can...”121 The 
inclusion of Great War veterans in the units of 2NZEF provide lessons on the mental stresses of war 
from both a theoretical and practical standpoint.  
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Chapter Five 
"It stands to reason that no man can serve for any length of time in the 
present war and be just the same man at the end of it.”1 
Introduction 
There are parallels between the two world wars in the chaos of enlistment in New Zealand, where 
recruitment systems could not efficiently process volunteer numbers. Lessons learned from the 
Great War regarding shell shock were not entirely forgotten, but the NZMC had been run down with 
the Regular Force and relied on civilian doctors for medical examinations of recruits. However, 
2NZEF as a whole benefitted from the lessons of man-management and medicine derived since the 
Great War. Maintenance of morale bolstered the ability of soldiers to withstand psychological 
breakdown and periods of rest, removing the division out of action to recover and assimilate 
replacements, benefitted the psychological health of the men. Sports and activities on intra-unit and 
inter-unit levels, such as the Freyberg Cup, kept the men occupied during rest periods and broke up 
the monotony of training.2 The team activities also assisted in team bonding, bonding new members 
of units into the team before they were exposed to the stress of combat. Furlough schemes were 
implemented for those who had been overseas for three years, giving the men something to look 
forward to other than continual combat. For a series of reasons that included influences in New 
Zealand, the schemes did not work as intended, but, despite perception of its mismanagement, it 
allowed some hope of visiting home.  
Japanese entry into the war caused a number of issues within 2NZEF. The formation of another New 
Zealand infantry division, 3rd NZ Division for service in the Pacific, stretched the nation’s capability to 
adequately man both infantry formations entirely with volunteers and also maintain industrial and 
agricultural production. Arrival of American forces in New Zealand created a number of social issues 
that exacerbated the problems of homesickness and isolation in 2NZEF. Conscripts were not seen 
completely positively by 2NZEF in North Africa and Italy and debate about their commitment in 
comparison to volunteer members of 2NZEF was continued long after the war. In New Zealand the 
relative proximity of the Japanese, even after fear of invasion was dispelled, made 3NZ Division a 
popular topic for newspapers and newsreels and it seemed to 2NZEF that they were side-lined and 
forgotten, causing disgruntlement amongst many soldiers. News of industrial unrest by workers who 
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2NZEF saw as taking the jobs they left behind to serve their country added to the isolation and 
created anger in some quarters. 
The sense of isolation led to a discernible change in attitude in NZEF towards men who were not 
seen as ‘pulling their weight’, as homesickness and war weariness accrued. Hardening of attitudes 
towards psychological casualties is discernible in the letters and diaries from 1944. When the 
diagnosis of ‘physical exhaustion’ was introduced it generated a tangible reason for mental 
breakdown and rapid recovery. Those that did not recover and were evacuated to New Zealand 
were not always seen with the same sympathy as psychological casualties had been previously. A 
significant indicator of a hardening attitude was a change in the language used by soldiers to 
describe the psychological casualty. As with any specific group there is a certain language that 
develops within the group that signifies in-group belonging. The language used describing 
psychological casualties became more disparaging in letters after 2NZEF moved into Italy, which also 
coincided with the emergence of difficulties with the furlough schemes and the introduction of 
conscription. Notably however, the change in language also coincided with a decline in overall 
morale in 2NZEF following Cassino. Significantly, this period was where 2NZEF experienced cold and 
mud that were most closely reminiscent of the conditions of the Great War.3  
Recruitment  
“It is more difficult to assess mental than physical ability and the 
psychologists must try to estimate what a man will be like in three or four 
months’ time.”4 
Recruitment processes in New Zealand at the start of World War Two were based on physical 
characteristics of volunteers and mental capacity was only a peripheral consideration. Civilian 
doctors, generally with only rudimentary understanding of military psychology, conducted the 
medical examinations where only obvious signs of mental unsuitability caused rejection. Medical 
staff predominantly believed predisposition was the major contributing cause in anxiety neurosis 
cases in 2NZEF up to March 1941, thereby focusing attention on this factor rather than any specific 
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mental capability of the individual for military service.5 Only after repeated demands from the 
medical cadre of 2NZEF in Egypt were checks carried out of the mental history of candidates from 
late 1941, where recruits names were checked with the Department of Health against lists of former 
mental patients.6 From the outbreak of hostilities British selection processes were intended to 
prevent men with predisposition to neurosis being enlisted. The Southborough Report noted the 
preponderance of men with prior mental health issues in psychological casualties.7 The question of 
predisposition was an important aspect of the pension system in both Britain and New Zealand. A 
history of neurosis shifted the onus from military service as a cause towards the man having a pre-
existing condition that was exacerbated, at worst, by service and was therefore reduced entitlement 
to disablement pensions. This policy was tightened in New Zealand and treatment before discharge 
was initiated and less than 5% of discharged psychological casualties were granted pensions. 8 No 
additional facilities were established following the outbreak of the war to deal with psychological 
casualties in New Zealand than existed before pre-war.9 The intention was that psychological 
casualties would, as far as possible, be treated within existing military facilities before return to New 
Zealand.10  
Peacetime service in New Zealand armed forces was at all times constrained by the willingness of 
the incumbent government to allocate defence funds. Especially following the period of the 
depression of the early 1930’s, which was still being felt in New Zealand at the end of the decade, 
defence expenditure was parsimonious at best. Recruitment was on a replacement basis of 
personnel who left the service and during times of economic hardship few left a service that assured 
employment. Management issues of the armed forces aside, the army found itself in 1939 with men 
in positions of responsibility who were no longer fit for active service.11 Not having a selection 
process in place that considered mental capability to withstand the strains of war and personnel 
who were no longer fit, 2NZEF found itself in the early months of the war of having some men in 
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Egypt who should not have been there. Men were returned to New Zealand for psychological 
reasons following medical boards even before major units of the Division had experienced combat.12 
Esprit de Corps and Morale 
“In addition to the ordinary sources of morale, such as justice of cause, pride 
in regiment, and supremacy in the use of weapons, etc., there is one thing 
that assists morals very highly— good food and good care taken of the 
men.”13 
Mechanical weapons and high explosives dispersed the twentieth century battlefield. Standing in 
closed ranks was acceptable for gunpowder warfare and the soldier took comfort from the proximity 
of comrades when under fire. Dispersal and cover from fire is necessary for survival where 
mechanical weapons exist so trust in the others in the group, being confident of the support of 
comrades, became a critical element in unit cohesion when spread out under fire.14 Being a member 
of a cohesive group was what kept men to their duty when they were seemingly alone and isolated. 
To be there ‘for their mates’ was a deep driving force in holding soldiers to duty under periods of 
danger and exposing themselves to the possibilities of death or injury. Esprit de corps and unit 
morale were separate but intertwined influences in keeping an individual bound to their group. 
Where morale declined, the incidences of psychological casualties rose within the New Zealand 
Division.15 The organisation of the New Zealand Division was based around battalions sourced from 
regional military districts within New Zealand and was an important factor in creating an esprit de 
corps within the division. Company troops were generally from the same provinces within those 
districts, for example 23Bn was recruited from the South Island and within the battalion A Company 
was from Canterbury, B Company from Southland and so on.16 Men from the same towns and 
regions were frequently known to each other and this eased their integration into units as they were 
formed or posted as replacements. While there was risk that heavy casualties in a unit could 
disproportionately affect a single community, the advantages familiarity with others within a unit 
was a strong component of morale, especially for replacements.  
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A significant proportion of men who broke down did so in their first experience of combat. An 
examination of unit morale, ‘Combat and Morale in the Eighth Army’ by Jonathan Fennell, shows 
that unit training garnered self-confidence which translated into mutual confidence between the 
men in the unit.17 The corollary to this was that the men themselves were bonded together and the 
feeling of belonging to the group became a critical factor in their individual morale. Loyalty to the 
group was strengthened once the unit entered combat through the experience of shared dangers 
and deprivation. 
Shared experiences at war bonded men in a manner that lasted much longer than the duration of 
combat. Unit cohesion and group belonging translated into group loyalty that was akin to a ‘them 
and us’ feeling in regard to other units. The group solidarity this encompassed was apparent at all 
levels of the army organisation and was generally applicable to all armies and formations to some 
extent.18 The small unit group that was the basic unit of a military formation in combat, the infantry 
section, the tank or gun crew and so on, was the primary group the individual directed their loyalty 
towards. Hew Strachan utilises the term ‘primary group theory’ to describe how the individual’s 
loyalty was held towards the men in their units.19 As the individual saw his own group as his means 
of survival, both in a context that it provided his primary needs and also as something that can be 
relied on for physical and psychological support in times of extreme stress, it is natural to view 
anyone that is not undergoing the same trials as the group as outsiders.  
Primary group theory affected the combatant soldier’s view of the non-combatant soldier. The close 
comradeship of the primary group aroused pride in the individuals within the group about their 
ability to withstand the conditions in which they found themselves, which generated a sense of 
‘uniqueness’ regarding the group, to the exclusion of others.20 This was not a simple ‘them and us’ 
equation though, as there was often an interchange of personnel between forward and rear 
echelons. Personnel who were placed before a medical board in 2NZEF, and downgraded from 
                                                          
17
 Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the path to El 
Alamein, (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 219. 
18 For an in depth examination of the concept of unit cohesion and loyalty to the small unit before the larger 
group see John C. McManus, The Deadly Brotherhood; The American Combat Soldier in World War II (Presidio 
Press, 1998), Edward J. Shils and Morris Janowitz, ‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World 
War II, The Public Opinion Quarterly, 12:2 (Summer 1948) and Martyn Thompson, Our War: The Grim Digs; 
New Zealand Soldiers in North Africa 1940-1943 (Penguin, 2005). The statistical survey conducted by Samuel A. 
Stouffer, The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath, Vol. 2 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1949) 
also indicates the strength of the primary group loyalty in combat veterans. 
19
 Hew Strachan, ‘The Soldiers Experience in Two World Wars: Some Historiographical Comparisons’, in Time to 
Kill; The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West 1939-1945, ed. Paul Addison and Angus Calder (Pimlico, 1997), 
p. 371. 
20
 John Ellis, The Sharp End of War: The Fighting Man in World War Two (David & Charles, 1980), p. 335 
75 
 
Grade 1 to Grade 2 or 3, were not returned to New Zealand but utilised where possible in the base 
camps or sedentary roles within the Division, such as Lines of Communications (LOC) staff, 
administrative roles or in necessary trades at base camps. Private W.D. Dawson of 23Bn writes in 
October 1943, just prior to the New Zealand Division being shipped to Italy, of his visit to a friend in 
No. 1 NZ General Hospital, 
 “...who is very down in the mouth poor chap, because the quack had told him that he is 
 definitely unfit for the battalion on account of his crook back & will have to get a base job. 
 Well, Roy is taking that hard. His first words when he saw me were “Take a good look at me 
 – I’m a bludger”, in a tone of deep disgust.”21 
To understand the generation of a coterie amongst combat troops within an army it is necessary to 
realise that the vast majority of a modern army does not actually come into contact with the enemy; 
neither does a sizeable proportion come enemy fire, bombardment or air attack. A mechanised army 
requires an enormous logistical apparatus to function and as many as ninety per cent will not have 
first-hand experience of combat.22 John Ellis argues this is a component in the feelings of ‘apartness’ 
that is felt between combat troops from Base units and Line of Communication troops.23 While there 
was a feeling of apartness in New Zealand troops, the proportion of LOC troops in 2NZEF was smaller 
than the other Allied armies, mostly due to the reliance on British and American supply lines that 
were needed to provide for only a single division and were outside of New Zealand’s ability to 
resource. 
The New Zealand Division in World War Two was an infantry division initially, of three brigades 
comprised of three infantry battalions, but later one brigade was converted to armour. As a 
generalisation, artillery, medical and engineering units were split between those directly supporting 
the infantry battalions and those units that were back from the line and provided a more 
overarching support role, such as heavy artillery, road engineering, transport, supply or hospital 
medical services that were out of range of enemy fire. In an infantry division the infantry battalions 
are the one who are actually in contact with the enemy for any extensive period of time, a battalion 
being roughly 700 men in the New Zealand Army. The average strength of the 2nd New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force was 30,000 men with nearly half of those serving as base personnel. At full 
strength, a rare situation following combat, there were just under 2,000 infantry in the division, not 
including armour, engineers or artillery. Infantrymen generally account for 90 per cent of combat 
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casualties in an infantry division, a rule of thumb that holds for New Zealand, British and United 
States armies.24 Clem Hollies, an officer of 21Bn promoted from the ranks following the Tunisian 
campaign in 1943, wrote in his reminiscences that,  
 “It is not widely appreciated that 90 per cent of all casualties in battle are suffered by the 
 infantry, ie. the “cutting edge.” The New Zealand division had a total strength of 14000; the 
 fighting strength – infantry, armour, artillery and engineers – was 5200; but the infantry 
 strength was 1800. So if the Division suffered say 900 casualties in a fixed-piece battle, this 
 was about 6 ½ per cent of the total strength, (which didn’t sound much) but would be 50 
 percent of the rifle companies.”25 
Combat troops often manifested solidarity in the form of elitism, which was necessitated by the 
need for high esprit de corps in order to survive, tinged with a sense of resentment against those 
who were not suffering in the same manner they were, in other words rear echelon troops.26 The 
individual soldier was bound to his group by mutual trust and reliance for survival and naturally saw 
all others as being outsiders that could not be trusted until they had proved themselves to the 
satisfaction of the group. An excerpt from the diary of private John Noel Atkinson, a signaller in 27 
NZ Machine-Gun Battalion, records details of an impromptu debate on ‘What the average soldier 
gained or lost in this war?’ that was held in his hut in Italy in March 1944, noting, “Upon the credit 
side, we had experience with a capital ‘E’, comradeship of a type which cannot be found elsewhere, 
and which will last a lifetime.”27 In being part of a close group that was reliant on each other for 
survival in a hostile environment, the individual felt bound to that group by very strong ties of loyalty 
that they knew were reciprocated. For this reason the guilt that is associated with psychological 
casualties is felt keenly by the casualty themselves, but is not reciprocated by the group, as is shown 
by the soldiers of NZEF in the Greta War and is also the case in World War Two to almost the same 
extent. 
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Attitudes Towards Psychoneurosis 
“Wounding of the mentality is far worse than the wounding of the body, and 
yet our army appears so little interested in it.”28 
The mental stresses on a soldier in a small unit in combat were shared by all those within the unit. As 
in the Great War, the possibility of sustaining a wound was as much a possibility for one man as 
another and, predisposition aside, the likelihood of one man breaking down mentally was the same 
as for any other. Sergeant William Stewart of the 18 Armoured Battalion writes in a letter home in 
May 1945 of the apprehension he felt before battle and how he believed it was a universal emotion 
for all men.  
 “We are all influenced by the way we feel about things and its impossible to convey, for 
 example, the feeling of apprehension one experiences before the start of a battle. This 
 colours everything. No matter how light heartedly we may go about the ordinary everyday 
 jobs that have to be done, no matter how unconcerned we may appear, we are all at one 
 time or another (some of us, all the time) thinking of what might lie ahead.”29 
Each man dealt with that fear differently. Captain Leonard Thornton, Adjutant of 5 New Zealand 
Field Regiment at the start of the war, writing in early 1980 in response to a question regarding the 
strength of religious feeling amongst men on the eve of battle notes “...I agree men seek comfort 
and reassurance from any source...Some men fall back on superstition, some on their friends, some 
on gallows humour, and so on.”30 Private F.L. Newcombe, of B Company, 4 NZ Field Ambulance, 
writes in his diary following the Greek campaign in 1941, “...one would expect differences in 
reaction, and so it was from the man who only once felt his heart go pitter-pat to the boy who 
sobbed by himself...and wished they would get him and end it all.”31 The recognition of the 
individual reactions to stress and how each individual reacted to it contrasts with the image of a unit 
of soldiers as a homogenous group with a single motivation.  
It is where men have not shown that they are willing to play their part in the group that there is any 
sign of negativity towards those displaying psychological symptoms. The three following excerpts are 
from letters of two officers and an enlisted man. They give contrasting views; sympathetic to those 
who were psychologically damaged or unfit for combat and unsympathetic to those who were 
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unwilling to face battle. Major John Bartrum, a doctor in 4 Field Ambulance in 1944, writes in his 
diary in March 1944, while at Cassino, of “Quite a steady stream came through including many 
exhaustion one case of sheer cowardice (a fellow who had deserted twice in the last month) and one 
a SIW through the foot (at least I am sure he is).”32 Use of the word ‘sheer’ indicates a sense of 
effrontery that such a thing could occur. An entry in Major Bartrum’s diary from November 1943,  
 “26.XI.43 [26/11/43] Very busy morning had just finished my ward round when we were 
 inundated with 11 nerve cases from the MDS for whom accommodation had to be found 
 since we had then only 2 empty beds. However we got it all jacked up OK by lunch time.”33 
An entry 2 days before Major Bartrum encountered his case of cowardice, on 18 March 1944 noted 
that “At 1030 had a batch of 9 cases, all slightly wounded a case of nervous exhaustion from 6 
Brigade.”34 Major Bartrum does not indicate anything out of the ordinary in the receipt of 
exhaustion cases, nor comments other than to record them. As the New Zealand Division was at 
Cassino, there was an understandable increase in the numbers of exhaustion cases coming into the 
Field Ambulances and Forward Dressing Stations. There were a mere 16 recorded cases of self-
inflicted wounds in the New Zealand Division throughout the whole war so this event in itself is 
notable.35 It was not seen as unusual to receive exhaustion cases in the Field Ambulances, needing 
no special comment by Major Bartrum, indicating that exhaustion was seen as a normal occurrence 
under the circumstances. 
 Two excerpts from the letters of Captain Arthur Allen, New Zealand Engineers give contrasting views 
of two individuals, one of whom left a convoy to Egypt in 1941 for what were seen as suspect 
motives, and the other regarding a man who had been returned to New Zealand after ‘doing his bit’. 
Captain Allen writes to his wife in May 1942 that,  
 “I was quite surprised to hear that a chap called Hammond that used to be attached to us... 
 had called. Your impression sums him up in a nutshell. He came over as far as Bombay and 
 then disclosed that he suffered from an ulcerated stomach or something and was sent back 
 home. Everyone took a poor view of it.” 36 
In the same letter a page later Captain Allen notes, “I am glad to hear that Wally Newth is back home 
safe & sound”. Again in September 1943, to his wife, Allen comments positively of repatriated 
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another man, “I hope he is lucky enough to get boarded as he is not at all well and anyway he has 
done his share.”37 The contrast in attitude could be explained as a consequence of gaining some 
insight into human nature under stress, as noted in the excerpts from Private Atkinson and 
Newcombe above, but two of Captain Allen’s observations are from the same letter before he 
entered combat. Lawrie Birks writes to his mother in August 1942 of a repatriated friend who “When 
he began to crack up, as they should have known he would, they had of course to send him back 
here.”38 Later, in March 1943, Birks again writes of an acquaintance that,  
“So thats [sic] apparently where he’s been all this time, in what used to be called a “cushy 
job” in the last war, well away from the fireworks... Not that I blame him for that, of course, 
there are plenty out there who would be only too pleased to take the job if they had the 
chance, and anyhow I expect Kealy would be Grade 2, which would keep him away from the 
battlefield in any case. He’s welcome to it as far as I’m concerned, anyhow, I’d be sorry to 
take a job of that sort as a contribution to the war effort.”39 
The contrasts that exist in the views of Private Birks and Captain Allen can be viewed in two ways. 
Firstly, Allen, as an officer and educated man (a civil engineer before the war), may hold disdain for 
anyone not matching his own personal moral standards. Birks takes a more charitable view of 
Kealy’s shortcomings, possibly because he does not have to match an officer’s personal example. 
The second possibility explaining the difference may be because Allen’s view was formed before he 
had seen combat and had little idea of the effects combat had on an individual. Roger Spiller, in ‘In 
the School of War’, quotes Charles E. Montague, “War hath no fury like a non-combatant” and 
argues that sympathy for psychological casualties was stronger nearer the front lines than the rear, 
“where facile moral judgements” about courage were made in ignorance about conditions in 
combat.40 The preconceptions of battle those yet untried often bore little connection with the 
realities of combat.  
The letters of Harry Delamere Barter Dansey, an NCO in the 28 Maori Battalion, and son of Major 
Harry Delamere Dansey who is quoted in Chapter Three, writes in two of his letters to his mother of 
his high expectations of his behaviour and later how he hates war and wants to leave. The first was 
written in March 1944 while still in training camp in New Zealand and states “And if I should not 
come back it will be the finest way of going that a real man can hope for...  if someone can sing 
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“Tama ngakau marie” that wonderful hymn for me then I will rest content.”41 In May 1945, days 
after the end of the war Sergeant Dansey writes that, 
  “...war is horrible.... God has been kind to me and I know that the prayers of you all were 
 answered. On two occasions in the last couple of weeks of the battle it could have been 
 nothing but the hand of God himself that saved me. When Jack Heketa was killed I did not 
 believe in Him anymore but now I think that perhaps Jack’s work here was over though it is 
 hard to see.  It is more than good luck when four poor fellows are killed within a few feet of 
 me and I have not even a scratch.”42  
The difference in attitude exhibited by Harry Dansey in these two excerpts show the change from an 
eager but immature young man dreaming about a hero’s death to a more mature man who has seen 
reality. In a survey conducted by General Kippenberger of veteran 2NZEF officers in 1956, and 
reprinted in W. Brown’s thesis in 1986, the replies noted that fear responses were most pronounced 
in those taking part in their first actions and among those who had become ‘stale’ through too long a 
period in combat.43   
 
Changing Attitudes: 1944. 
“I’ve had enough of this war already, and was a fool to come back… My real 
trouble is that I’m terribly homesick…, and also my nerve and keenness for 
the panoply of war as ‘twere, is definitely not what it was three years ago – 
in other words I’ve had enough. There is one thing I am sure of – the calibre 
of the men in this Coy and Bn (mostly conscripts) will never equal that of the 
old Bn.”44 
The language used when referring to psychoneurosis changed over the course of World War Two, 
indicating a change in attitude towards it as an entity as well as a change in their view of 
psychological casualties. Euphemism was a means of showing membership of a group, sometimes 
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utilising language that was unintelligible to the uninitiated.45 Private Coughland of 5 Field Ambulance 
wrote of transporting a body to the base morgue, “Brought him back with us to the ice-house. A stiff 
ain’t good company for a man…”46 Slang, though, is used in a wider group setting and terms can 
enter into general use by transcending the professional boundary.47 ‘Shell Shock’ is an example of 
where a professional term has entered into the general lexicon, and in this case outlasted the life of 
the term in its original use. ‘Up the monk’ or ‘out the monk’ became 2NZEF slang, with indefinable 
origin but exclusive use, to describe anything disorganised or messy.48 Slang was also found to 
reduce fear by trivialising it and removing any mystique.49  
The terms used to describe psychological casualties by troops altered through the war, although 
‘shell shock’ was used throughout in letters. Private Newcombe uses the term ‘badly shaken’ to 
describe soldiers badly affected by bombing in Greece.50 Corporal T.G. Bain uses the term ‘nerves… 
shot to shreds’ to describe two “Tommies” who were at Dunkirk and had broken down under air 
attacks during the retreat through Greece.51 In Crete, Corporal H.M Adams of 18Bn uses the term 
‘hysterical’ to describe those who broke under continual air attack.52 Also from Crete, although from 
a narrative written in 1990, Private Raymond Kennedy of 22Bn, relates how “The German’s [sic] 
were now using large mortars and the noise and thump...was nerve shattering, no wonder the dogs 
suffered from shell shock.”53 Lawrie Birks writes to his mother in August 1942, just before El 
Alamein, “We see the chaps who come back from the blue every now and again after they’ve been 
through hospital... as they’re all wounded or shell-shocked or ill...”54 In the same letter Birks refers to 
Jim Grimsley, graded to New Zealand for psychoneurosis, who “… began to crack up, as they should 
have known he would...”55 Birks refers to Jim Grimsley in a number of letters in terms that were 
consistantly friendly. Sergeant Ian McNeur of 23Bn, in November 1943 “...a bomb...took the end out 
of a mans [sic] slit trench about three inches from his head... he was O.K. apart from ringing ears but 
left a few hours later with shell shock.”56 Using the term shell shock at this time, with the efficient 
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use of exhaustion centres attached to the Field Ambulances in the New Zealand Division and anxiety 
neurosis as a semi-official designation for psychological casualties, further highlights the depth of its 
attachment in the public mind and memory. 
By the end of 1943 other terms were being used to describe psychological casualties. Letters were 
being written using slang terms that reflected the interpretations soldiers themselves placed on 
events that caused mental injury to their comrades. Private Denham Dawson of 23Bn describes in a 
letter in May 1943 how, “I saw Archie Austin, who was in the throes of recuperation after going out 
with concussion from a shell-burst – “bomb-happy”, to use the Army term.”57 The term is self-
explanatory, probably enhancing its use in the same manner, but to a lesser extent than ‘shell 
shock’. In recalling Italy in April 1945 Gunner W. Patterson of 5th Field Regiment wrote how, “Snipers 
gave me the creeps, a healthy dose of anxiety NZ’...”58 The connotation of “anxiety NZ” is that it is a 
means of return to NZ. At the stage of the war Gunner Patterson is writing 2NZ Division was moving 
rapidly through northern Italy in the last days of the war and there were significantly fewer cases of 
anxiety neurosis being diagnosed and removed from the combat zone than in the previous two 
years.59 New Zealand troops showed greater depth of feeling at this time regarding members of the 
population who were seen to be not making the same effort to finish the war and allow the men in 
the service to return home. Coupled with this was a feeling that the standard of men that were 
being sent from New Zealand through conscription was not up to the standard of the volunteers of 
the earlier echelons and reinforcements. There is a tinge of resentment in the term ‘anxiety NZ’ that 
is not present in the terms ‘bomb happy’ or even ‘shell shock’, as there was more impatience to be 
home than was exhibited previously.  
From the time the NZ Division landed in Italy in October 1943 references to psychological casualties 
regularly began to be based around the word ‘nerve’. Major Bartrum uses the term ‘nerve cases’ in 
his diary in November 1943.60 Several months later there are references to ‘nervous exhaustion’ and 
‘exhaustion’ in his diary from 18 and 20 March 1944.61 Using two specific terms in a short space of 
time indicates he sees them, and therefore diagnoses them, as separate entities. Private Cecil 
Coughland of 5th Field Ambulance writes in his diaries using the terms ‘cracked up’, ‘exhaustion’ and 
‘nervous cases’ with a two month period, again highlighting the differentiation in understanding 
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between psychological injury and physical exhaustion.62 A soldier at war expected to suffer 
discomfort and deprivation and the introduction of exhaustion centres was recognition that human 
endurance was not unlimited. There is also the realisation among that manpower has to be 
conserved, not necessarily strictly for humanitarian reasons, but for the fact that as the war 
progressed replacements for casualties were not inexhaustible. Therefore reducing wastage through 
psychological causes was a means of easing manpower demands. In the context of New Zealand 
itself this also meant the ability to maintain industrial and agricultural production by minimising 
demands on the workforce through conscription.  
From the end of 1943 exhaustion as a diagnosis was introduced, and was used by troops themselves 
to describe what was occurring in their units. The concept and use of ‘exhaustion’ as a possible 
official diagnosis and treatment stream within the NZMC had coincided approximately with the end 
of the Tunisian campaign.63 The shift in tone of references to psychological casualties that occurred 
at about this time coincided with the introduction of ‘physical exhaustion’ for what were previously 
designated ‘anxiety neurosis’. Harder attitudes arose against those who were thought to be ‘not 
doing their share’. Complaints in letters about strikers in New Zealand, furlough men not returning, 
and reference to the poor standard of conscripts meant malingerers were viewed with less 
sympathy than previously. An excerpt from a March 1944 report from Colonel Boyd, Consulting 
Physician in 2NZEF Headquarters, notes that more men are succumbing to ‘Exhaustion’ from recent 
drafts than from long serving veterans. Colonel Boyd states that he considers the reinforcement 
drafts into 2NZ Division contain low quality men and goes on to highlight the likelihood that they will 
be maladjusted in their new environment and therefore have a high chance of breaking down.64 In 
the circumstances where men are broke down easily and before they had an opportunity to meld 
into the small unit group, there was not, as noted above, the same empathy from other members of 
the unit as there was towards more established members of the group. The introduction of a term 
like ‘anxiety NZ’ into the vernacular infers a measure of derision towards the victim that was not 
present prior to the campaign in Italy.  
Exhaustion cases were returned to their units after three or four days, following a sedated sleep, hot 
food, rest and an explanation from a clinician to the man why he was ill and the physiological 
processes that occurred to caused his problem. If there was no response at this stage the man was 
sent back from the Exhaustion Centre to No. 3 NZ General hospital where he was placed into the 
grading process that either returned him to his unit after convalescence, or boarded as medically 
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unfit and allocated base jobs or returned to New Zealand. Men leaving their units with exhaustion 
were not admitted to hospital unless they did not respond to early treatment, they were only listed 
in unit diaries as being sick.65 The process of using exhaustion centres afforded a quick recovery and 
returned men as soon as possible to their units, allowing them to keep their self-respect as they did 
not have the ignominy of a record of psychological breakdown on their medical records.66 The 
dissemination of the physiological and psychological processes that placed a man in an exhaustion 
centre did, however, provide an expert view of the difference between exhaustion from combat and 
mental illness for laymen which reinforced any existing prejudices against mental illness.   
By the end of 1944 there was a significant desire within men of 2NZEF to return to New Zealand. 
They did not believe the government had lived up to the promises it made for the furlough schemes. 
Letters home began to mention issues that the men saw as having a direct influence on the length of 
time they would be serving overseas. “The Gov’t is to blame” and “Electioneering racket” were 
typical comments reported by field censors for men who were anxiously waiting their turns to return 
home.67 The men did not blame the furlough men who stayed in New Zealand and commented 
negatively on their treatment by authorities. They also realised that by not returning they were 
jeopardising the chances of furlough of those still overseas. A gunner writes in February 1944, “By all 
accounts there is quite a bit of bother at home with the furlough chaps. I don’t blame them either, 
but at the same time if they don’t come back we won’t get home till the war is over.”68 However, 
there was real resentment against fit men in New Zealand who would not enlist. A further concern 
for 2NZEF troops were fit men in New Zealand who were in jobs in essential industries that the 
veterans believed could enlist and replace long service men. “I’d like to see the Gov’t weed out a lot 
of essential industries in NZ and send overseas some of the 35000 fit men there in the country doing 
nothing and making no sacrifices.”69 Comments reported from troops letters include the 
comments“… that there are too many people in NZ  who do not know there is a war on” and “who 
are not pulling their weight”; people at home are labelled as “smug complacents” and the only ones 
who are considered to realise that “there is a war on, are those with husbands, sons and brothers 
serving overseas”.70  The depth of feeling is exhibited in a letter written in March 1944, during 
Cassino, by a Staff Sergeant responding to a Westcoast strike for an increased butter ration, “I would 
like to get cracking with a Tommy gun around Reefton or some place like that”.71 That a person in a 
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responsible position felt it necessary to consider and communicate the idea of utilising automatic 
weapons on strikers indicates the strength of the feeling held on this matter.  
In a small team, where each member had to trust each other for their survival, psychological 
casualties were a danger to all. Major C.F.S. Caldwell of 20 Armoured regiment recalls, “On one 
occasion I had a crew member who developed mild ‘shell shock’. We were extremely pleased to 
have him replaced although we regretted his problem.”72 There is sympathy in this statement but 
there is also the realisation that it was necessary to remove the man from the crew. Major Caldwell 
exhibits sympathy but also shows relief that the psychological casualty was removed. Corporal Cecil 
Shinnick of 25Bn wrote in his diary of a man in his platoon who ‘lost his nerve’ from artillery with 
delayed action fuses which “...buried themselves deep in the ground before exploding, causing a 
severe earthquake in the vicinity” and, 
 “...from a big fourteen stone strapping specimen of manhood, he became a whimpering hulk 
 of a man. One minute he had to be restrained from shooting himself, and the next he was 
 reading his bible. He was so helpless that he messed his trousers.”73 
Corporal Shinnick received a cash prize for winning an essay competition run by the NZEF Times for a 
story written about his experiences in the Cassino battle and used it to get his diaries typeset.74 That 
this ‘whimpering hulk’ had to be restrained indicates men were distracted from their duty to do so, 
and if the unit was in action this endangers all those around him.  
In relating events after Cassino, Shinnick describes in less than flattering terms several men who 
broke down, decrying one as “...always developing a crucial attack of nerves when he was most 
needed.”75 He later describes an incident where another man panics at night and starts shooting 
wildly and “left us shortly after, graded for nerves.”76 The tenor of these quotes is less charitable 
than those seen previously. In both cases Shinnick has described these men’s breakdowns occurring 
in depleted units while under threat of contact with the enemy. More extreme, Major Bartrum’s use 
of the words “sheer cowardice” to describe a man during the Cassino battles is a harsh term rarely 
used in correspondence, indicating either or both stress on the user and exasperation that a man 
would leave his mates at such a time.77  
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The arrival of conscripts in large numbers from late 1943 highlighted a number of existing issues in 
2NZEF. Concerns within 2NZEF regarding fit men in New Zealand not volunteering did not lead to a 
unanimous welcome for conscripts. The critical need to fit new men into teams for mutual survival 
overcame any individual animosity or concern. However, there were concerns about the standard of 
men. Major Tuan Emery of 23Bn, stated in 1959 that, 
“All the volunteers were there because they wanted to be; not all of the conscripted soldiers 
would have been present if they could have avoided it. Their zest for battle reflected this … 
The coincidence of late arrival of reluctant soldiers with the obvious coming of the end of 
the war, made the latter [conscripts], even more determined to survive, to the detriment of 
the quality of their service.”78 
General Gentry noted, also in 1959, that,  
“I have sometimes said that we never fought again with the élan of the 1941 Libyan 
campaign (volunteers all), but what we lost in élan we made up for in skill and experience 
later in the war. It is difficult to make comparisons between the performances of volunteers 
& conscripts. They both performed well with good leaders.”79 
McLeod notes there was no real animosity between conscripts and volunteers in 2NZEF as the 
original volunteer numbers were depleted through repatriation or casualty rates and conscripts 
increased in proportion.80  
“I’ve had enough of this war already, and was a fool to come back… My real trouble is that 
I’m terribly homesick…, and also my nerve and keenness for the panoply of war as ‘twere, is 
definitely not what it was three years ago – in other words I’ve had enough. There is one 
thing I am sure of – the calibre of the men in this Coy and Bn (mostly conscripts) will never 
equal that of the old Bn.”81 
Overall there was no real decline in the standard of men, only a decline in the willingness of the men 
to place themselves in harm’s way when they saw the war as nearly over and that they had no 
advantage in being away from their jobs and communities. As Major Caldwell noted it was in the 
interests of the veterans, who were quickly becoming a conscript majority themselves, to assimilate 
recruits into their crews and sections as quickly as possible for their own survival. It was the 
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‘dodgers’ that gave the majority a bad name and as with any social group it is the extreme elements 
that receive the most notice. 
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Conclusion 
“We are always scared as Hell. It’s a case of fighting fear. If you win, you are 
all right. If not, you are done.”82 
There were a number of obvious similarities in the attitude of New Zealand soldiers in the two 
Expeditionary Forces towards psychological casualties, as there were a number of differences. 
Geography, science and social change through the period of the Great War and the following years 
created influences that caused attitudinal differences towards shell shock and psychoneurosis. There 
is juxtaposition of attitudes towards psychological casualties between military authorities and 
soldiers at the beginning of the Great War to the end of World War Two. Shell shock was an 
unexpected entity at the beginning of the Great War and it was several years before military and 
medical authorities were able to understand and manage the illness without unjust treatment of the 
victims. Troops who were experiencing the circumstances that generated shell shock had a different 
perspective of it than their commanders, viewing psychological injury as a natural hazard of their 
situation, not as personal failure or malingering. Their experiences indicated that any man subjected 
to the conditions of the front lines during the Great War was susceptible to psychological injury and 
was therefore deserving of the same sympathy as those who were physically wounded. However, it 
took several years of war before there was any official recognition that psychological casualties were 
not willing victims and were treated with any form of equanimity. By the end of the Great War 
treatment for shell shock, through PIE units, had become sufficiently efficient to be the basis for the 
exhaustion centre treatment method used in World War Two. Military medical knowledge advanced 
between the wars to the point where by the end of 1944 treatment was effective, and importantly 
for the maintenance of unit strengths, efficient enough to return the majority of men to their units 
within days, without the stigma associated with mental illness.  
By the time the exhaustion centres were working effectively, troops in 2NZEF were becoming less 
sympathetic towards men who were proving incapable of sustaining any will to stay in their units 
while in the combat zones. The responses to psychological casualties in 2NZEF in the early years of 
World War Two, till approximately the time the division moved to Italy, mirrored those of NZEF in 
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the Great War. A portion of the treatment for psychoneurosis was an explanation of its physiological 
causes and the effect these had psychologically on the individual. This separated in the minds of the 
troops the mental aspects of physical exhaustion from the mental causes of neurosis.  
Homesickness and war weariness affected the morale of New Zealand troops through the Italian 
campaign as it dragged on through 1944. New Zealand’s inability to maintain sufficient replacements 
for casualties in 2NZEF meant those who were overseas were unable to gain leave periods or be 
returned home, causing grievance as a sense of isolation grew. Subsequently there was less patience 
with men who were unable to stay with their units and were repatriated to New Zealand. Men 
leaving their units for psychological reasons received less sympathy from those they left in their 
units, especially if they did not have strong bonds with members of the unit.  
The military attitudes towards shell shock and psychoneurosis, at both command and combat level, 
were not held in isolation from the public sphere. From the time their young men were returning 
home mentally broken there was concern in the public arena. Even if the causes and treatments 
were unsure, there was a will to provide for these men who had gone overseas to serve their 
country. Public sympathy was extensive and this transferred to the government departments dealing 
with pensions and rehabilitation. Difficulties in rehabilitation were not the result of lack of desire to 
help but were primarily the result of limited resources as sheer numbers overwhelmed the 
administrative capacity of government departments. There was a determination from families that 
their men were not to be institutionalised in ‘asylums with lunatics’. Public understanding of shell 
shock differed from the military and medical definition, becoming a universal term to describe any 
mental issues resulting from service in the armed forces. Coupled with the success of 
psychotherapeutic methods of treatment for shell shocked veterans, which were conducted in 
isolation from the psychiatric institutions, a differentiation was established in the public mind 
between neuroses associated with war and mental illness in the community. Successful treatment 
following amalgamation of military and civilian neurotics helped establish psychotherapy as a viable 
medical science, which by the beginning of World War Two was well established in New Zealand.  
Attitudes towards psychological casualties held by 2NZEF soldiers changed through the period of 
World War Two. At the beginning of the war soldiers had the attitudes that were held by NZEF 
soldiers at the end of the Great War, exhibiting sympathy and some envy in their removal from the 
danger of combat. By the end of World War Two there was still sympathy and envy, but there was 
less patience for men who were malingerers or who were not prepared to actually make an effort to 
face battle. The causes of these changes were the result of two major contributing factors, the 
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perception troops in 2NZEF had of New Zealand society during the war and personnel issues in 
maintaining the strength of 2NZEF through the length of the war.  
It was expected that attitudes to psychological casualties would be influenced from troop’s 
comprehension of shell shock and what it meant to them as civilians in New Zealand between the 
two wars. The evidence seen in researching this paper does not indicate that the men of 2NZEF had 
any accurate knowledge of shell shock or psychoneurosis when they entered World War Two. Their 
expectations were formed from public memory of the Great War and the view that their war could 
not be as bad as the war their fathers experienced. Their influences were their literature, the 
magazines they read as teenagers and not the books from the war book era of the late 1920’s.  
What seems more certain is that the views of the late 20th Century  were more influenced by ‘war 
books’ than the men who actually fought in World War Two, as our conception of the Great War 
today more closely matches that of the works of Remarque and Sherriff than it does of the letters of 
the soldiers themselves. Public memory of the Great War has highlighted the “dirt on the end of the 
stick”, as General Sir Ian Hamilton put it, in representing the scenes of horror and fear in the Great 
War as the sum total of the soldiers’ experiences.83 The actualities of soldiers’ lives at war were not 
exposed, where the writing took a position on either extreme of the middle truth, highlighting the 
ghastly, or emphasising the glory. Rarely, if at all, was the boredom interrupted by terror, 
comradeship, discomfort, pleasure and relief of leave, confusion and all the other minutiae of a 
soldier’s life in wartime expressed in art or literature. The silence of the veterans, used to talking 
only amongst themselves, meant their defence was taken up by public memory and what that 
meant to New Zealand as a nation, creating the situation where the challenge to public memory 
became a challenge to New Zealand nationhood. As the Great War became fogged in myth and 
fiction, it gave those who served in World War Two little accurate conception of what they were 
going to face once in combat.  
It is not remarkable that the attitudes of 2NZEF soldiers showed the same compassion and sympathy 
towards psychological casualties as the men of NZEF. Despite their belief that their war was different 
from that of their fathers, World War Two soldiers found that the outcomes of combat on their 
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minds were the same, that the only difference was the scale of numbers engaged at any one time. 
And in the circumstances of combat where the view of the battlefield is limited to the range of the 
individual’s vision, often face down under cover, in smoke or at night, scale of numbers was 
irrelevant as local intensity of combat was the same in both wars. What differed were the external 
influences on the attitudes of the soldier. The main focus of communications was with New Zealand 
for 2NZEF, not Britain as with NZEF, so events in New Zealand were more immediate and relevant. 
The lessons of the Great War regarding leave meant there was an opportunity that was not present 
in NZEF, but also meant there was a line of communication regarding events in New Zealand that 
addressed the concerns of men in 2NZEF directly, not filtered through government information 
services. These were the mechanisms that caused the changes in the attitudes held by 2NZEF 
towards psychological casualties. 
A skein of rope could be an apt simile for the history of the psychological casualty. As in a rope, each 
fibre is not continuous, as is the events, personalities and discoveries that create the thread of this 
story. From the earliest recognition of nostalgia to the most recent use in popular media of the term 
shell shock instead of PTSD, there has been a mix of military, medical and public contribution to the 
story, each of which entwine to supply a strand of the rope, reliant on its neighbouring strand for 
unity and continuity. Railway spine focused the public attention to hysteria as a direct consequence 
of trauma and the military supplied ample hysterical cases to develop Myer’s shell shock theories. 
Freud suggested the direction of effective treatment for neuroses that led Wiltshire and Rivers, et al 
to question the dominance of asylum psychiatry in treating shell shock. Public interaction with the 
military in New Zealand determined how returned soldiers were seen and treated within the 
community. And so on, as each facet of neurosis and shell shock, of cause and treatment, of 
effective and spurious cures and attitudes combine to provide the background to the attitude of 
men in combat to their comrades breaking down. 
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